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BANKRUPTCY'S ACEPHALOUS MOMENT:
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
David Gray Carlson*

INTRODUCTION
1

Bankruptcy law's most acephalous moment is its governance of
unauthorized postpetition transfers of property belonging to the
bankruptcy estate. On the one hand, Bankruptcy Code § 549(a)
"avoids" such transfers. 2 On the other hand, transfers in violation of
3
the automatic stay are, by judge-made law, "void" or "voidable. " But
if this latter proposition is true, why is § 549(a) avoidance ever
necessary? Is it not a complete superfluity?
Armed with this insight, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals all
but eliminated § 549(a) avoidance as a concept governing
*

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
' "Acephalous" means "without a head, without reason ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 14 (1993). I use this term because bankruptcy law has a certain
reason to it; nevertheless the Bankruptcy Code has anomalous, "acephalous" mome n ts at war
with the overall conceptual structure. For a survey of acephalous moments, see David Gray
Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principk, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549 (1999). Hegel mentions
acephalous humans in his Logic. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF
LOGIC 799-800 (A.V. Miller trans. 1969) (1830) ("Thus for example the essentiality of the
brain for physical man is contradicted by the instance of acephalous individuals, the
essentiality of the protection of life and property for the state, by the instance of despotic
states and tyrannous governments."). Hegel's point is that reason requires unreason. Because
genetic defect is a necessary part of the system, "spirit" cannot be induced from empirical data
because we might have before us a defective example. Similarly, law, including bankruptcy
law, requires its acephalous moments so that there can always be a gap between positive and
natural law.
' 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000) . According to§ 549(a):
Except as provided in subsections (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a
transfer of property of the estate( I) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(£) or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
' See infra text accompanying notes 92-126.
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postpetition transfers. In 40235 Washington Street Corp. v. Lusardi,4 a
buyer at a postpetition foreclosure sale was not permitted to invoke
5
the "bona fide purchaser" defense to § 549(a) avoidance, as the
foreclosure sale was already "void" for violating the automatic stay. 6
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the bona fide purchaser
defense is not an expressly made exception to the automatic stay in
Bankruptcy Code § 362 (b) , bona fides could not save the buyer. 7
This was the case even though the debtor filed its bankruptcy
8
petition in bad faith.
Had a bankruptcy trustee avoided this
transfer under§ 549(a), the buyer would have had an opportunity
to assert a bona fide purchaser defense, and, in any case, the bad
faith dismissal would have revived the transfer. 9 However, given
automatic stay voidness, the good faith postpetition transferee
10
enjoyed no such defense and no such resurrection. Judge-made
law was permitted to erase explicit statutory enactments.
This decision certainly proved that something is rotten in the
Denmark of postpetition transfers.
To restore order to the
postpetition chaos, this Article aims to challenge the judge-made
rule that postpetition transfers in violation of the automatic stay are
void because any such rule wipes out § 549(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Transfers of the bankruptcy estate must be considered
voidable, not void, within the purview of§ 549 (a). Such a conclusion
is necessary to preserve the defenses listed in§ 549(b), (c), and (d).
Further defenses might exist in § 550(b) and (e), but these are
problematically applied against the trustee in § 549(a) cases. I
propose to show why this is so. The problem with § 550 defenses is
that they are defenses to the trustee's cause of action under
11
§ 550(a).
Yet it is far from clear that § 550(a) is necessary to
'
'

329 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denim, 124 S. Ct. 469 (2003) .
Seell U.S.C.§549(c).
6
329 F.3d at 1080.
1
Id. "Eighteen exceptions ... are listed in section 362(b).... The text of section
362(a) makes reference to the exceptions listed in section 362(b) . .. but not to any other
exceptions." Id.
' Id. at 1078.
• Seell U.S.C. § 349(b)(l)(B) .
0
'
Lusardi has been strongly endorsed in Singf,eton v. Abusaad (In re Abusaad), 309 B.R.
895 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004), and Ford v. Loftin (In re Ford), 296 B.R. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2003). For a case reaching the same result without relying on Lusardi, see Bustamonte v.
Cueva (In re Cueva), 371 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2004).
" According to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a),

2004]

Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment

115

achieve avoidance under § 549(a).
It would follow that a
postpetition transferee has the defenses listed in § 549 but not the
defenses listed in § 550.
In its attempt to theorize the confusing regime of postpetition
transfers, Part I of this Article compares § 549(a) avoidance and
automatic stay voidness in order to show that the former must
trump the latter . . Part II considers whether defenses to § 549(a)
avoidance are also defenses against automatic stay voidness and vice
versa. Here I criticize the Ninth Circuit's Lusardi opinion, which
nearly abolishes § 549(a) avoidance altogether in favor of an allenveloping automatic stay voidness doctrine. Part III considers the
12
intriguing case of Beeler v. Jewell (In re Stanton).
In Stanton, the
Ninth Circuit held that postpetition advances to a non-debtor that
were guaranteed by a mortgage granted by the debtors could validly
encumber the debtors' property interest. u In effect, the debtors
were held empowered to make postpetition transfers, regardless of
the automatic stay or § 549(a). Any such transfer, however, was
deemed to be junior to the trustee's strong arm lien. Stanton adds a
refinement to postpetition transfer law.
It stands for the
proposition that a debtor's right to a bankruptcy surplus under
§ 726(a) (6) is perfectly alienable. The debtor's conveyance of this
surplus, however, cannot interfere with the integrity of the trustee's
senior interest. As a prelude to discussing the Stanton case, a short
examination of the Ninth Circuit's benighted vocabulary pertaining
14
to postpetition transfers is necessary.
I.

AVOIDANCE UNDER§ 549(a)

According to § 54l(a), "[t]he commencement of a
[bankruptcy] case ... creates an estate" to be administered by a
trustee for the benefit of the general creditors. This simple fact

to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section . .. 549 . . . the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred , or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property, from( I) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made ....
12
303 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), a.ffg248 B.R. 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) .
" Id. at 941.
" Perhaps because of its confusing vocabulary, the Ninth Circuit has many more
postpetition transfer cases than other circuits.
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15

implies that, when D files a bankruptcy petition, D conveys the
lion's share of her property rights to a trustee. Bankruptcy is first
and foremost a property transfer.
Given the fact that D has conveyed away her property to a
trustee, we are already licensed to suspect that§ 549(a) avoidance is
likely to be unnecessary and superfluous. If D has already conveyed
away most of her property, D is disabled (to use a Hohfeldian
16
word ) from affecting the trustee's property by transferring it.
Suppose, after filing for bankruptcy, D purports to convey
prepetition property to X. How can D possibly give any title to X
when D has no title to give? The trustee needs no avoidance theory
17
to assert better title than X.
In fact, D does have some prepetition rights that she could
convey postpet1t1on: her right to exempt property and also her
right to a bankruptcy surplus under§ 726(a) (6). But these interests
are precisely not property of the estate, and so any transfer of them
cannot violate the trustee's rights. Furthermore, it appears to be the
case that, even after bankruptcy, D has the right to live rent free in
18
her prepetition house. Presumably this non-trespassory status can
be conveyed. But nothing about this conveyance can interfere with

" In the examples that follow, Dis the bankrupt debtor. A is a prepetition transferee. X
is a postpetition transferee. X may derive title (if any) from Dor possibly from A , where A has
a power to dispose of D's property. For example, if A has a valid recorded mortgage, A is
sometimes empowered to sell D's equity (and the bankruptcy estate's equity) to X. Two other
characters to appear are Pand S, respectively, parent and subsidiary corporations of D.
16
See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REAsONING 36-38 (Walter W. Cook ed., Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1919).
17
This is sometimes referred to as using § 544(a) defensively. For example, in In re
Loewen Group International, Inc., beneficiaries of a real estate trust claimed to own proceeds of
real estate a debtor-in-possession sold. 292 B.R. 522, 525 (Bankr. D . Del. 2003). The court
ruled that the bankruptcy estate, not the beneficiaries, owned the underlying real estate and
hence the proceeds. Id. at 531. The beneficiaries protested that the debtor-in-possession was
making this claim for the first time after the two year statute of limitations under§ 546(a) had
run. Id. at 526. But the court stated the debtor-in-possession could use § 544(a) (3)
defensively without any regard to § 546(a) . Id. at 528. In simpler terms, the debtor-inpossession took the real estate into the bankruptcy estate free and clear of the beneficiaries'
estate's right.
1
'
See In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1991). See generally Vladimir Elgort, Note, Do
Debtors Owe Rent to Their Bankruptcy Trustee for Remaining in the Ho= After Filing and Prior to
Foredosure, Notwithstanding a HO'TTIJ!Stead Exemption?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2253 (2002). For the

view that the trustee should have the right to rents on the unexamined assumption that the
trustee owns the fee simple of the house, see Robert B. Chapman, The Bankruptcy of HaigSimons? The Inequity of Equity and the Definition of Incoml! in Consuml!T Bankruptcy Cases, 10 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 765 (2002).
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the trustee's own right to use, sell, or lease the house pursuant to
19
§ 363. D's conveyance is simply junior to the rights of the trustee.
Section 549(a) avoidance becomes relevant if and only if Dor
some other party has an identifiable power to dispose of the
bankruptcy estate, free and clear of the trustee's interest. This
follows by definition. To "avoid" presupposes something valid on
2
which the activity of avoidance can operate. ° For example, suppose,
prior to bankruptcy, D conveys a valid, perfected lien to A and
subsequently files for bankruptcy. A now has a power to foreclose
on the bankruptcy estate. Of course, this power is automatically
stayed. For the moment, assuming away the automatic stay, suppose
A uses her power to convey title to X. The bankruptcy trustee must,
if she can, step forward and recover the property (from X) that A
conveys. 21 In short, § 549(a) avoidance presupposes a power, either
from state law or the Bankruptcy Code, to convey property of the
bankruptcy estate, free and clear of the trustee.
A.

The Superfluity of§ 549(a)

Some examples may be given of unnecessary citations to
22
§ 549(a) when other theories suffice to explain the result. Misuse
of§ 549(a) is not just a formal error. It is substantively important
23
because § 549 (a) is subject to a two-year statute oflimitations. If it

" One court has tried to justify the use of§ 549(a) in cases where D makes a conveyance
on the grounds that the automatic stay does not prevent D from making conveyances of estate
property. In re Cueva, 371 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, D would have power to
convey. But this overlooks the fact that bankruptcy is a transfer and the debtor is divested of
property which is in the bankruptcy estate.
"' See David Gray Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 441 (2001)
("Since the negative of something always presupposes a something to negate, the negative
moment is always a double, 'dia-lectical' one.") (footnote omitted).
" Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 6001 places the burden of proof on the party
claiming the validity of the conveyance, not on the trustee, even though the trustee must
affirmatively avoid the conveyance in an adversary proceeding. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6001. This
carries forward the same rule from§ 70(d) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch . 541, § 70(d) (5), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, tit. IV,§ 401 (a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682) .
" Sometimes § 549(a) is cited because an unperfected lien is perfected after
bankruptcy. E.g., Brandt v. 440 Assocs. (In re S.E. Banking Corp.) , 150 B.R. 833 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1993). In fact, the security interest is simply subordinated to the trustee's strong arm
power.
" 11 U.S.C. § 549(d) (2000).
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is conceded that no avoidance theory is implicated, the statute of
24
limitations in§ 506(d) becomes irrelevant.
The classic example of unnecessary citation to § 549(a) is Olsen
25
v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen).
In this case, D purported to convey
26
bankruptcy estate property to his son. In truth, D's conveyance was
ineffective to convey anything to the detriment of the bankruptcy
estate because D had no power over it. Nevertheless, the Olsen court
found: (1) The conveyance was effective; (2) the trustee had
avoidance rights under § 549(a); (3) the statute of limitations
commences to run only upon the trustee's discovery of the
conveyance; and (4) the trustee had (fortunately) filed his
complaint within two years of discovery-though beyond the two
27
year statute of limitations in § 549(d).
Olsen implies that the
debtor could have conveyed away estate property if the trustee had
known and did not bring an avoidance action within the statute of
limitations. In fact, the Olsen court should have left§ 549(a) out of
the analysis. Rather, it was simply that D's conveyance could have no
28
possible effect on the bankruptcy trustee's rights.
29
A similar case is McCord v. Agard (In re Bean). In this case, a
debtor-in-possession, on the very day his chapter 11 case was
converted to chapter 7, conveyed his house without authority to
30
buyers who knew of the bankruptcy.
The trustee, who had
obtained the proceeds from the sale, also sought to recover the
31
house under § 549(a). The court ruled that because the trustee
had received the proceeds, he could not also sue to avoid the

" In re Loewen Group Int'!, Inc., 292 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (finding mere
assertion of estate ownership not implicated in any statute of limitations). Eve n if§ 549(d)
does not apply, it will be necessary for a federal court to borrow state law statutes oflimitations
if a third party has taken the bankruptcy estate without court approval. In Burtch v. Ganz (In re
Mushroom Transp. Co.), 382 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2004), debtor's counsel embezzled estate funds ,
and the court borrowed a two year statute of limitations for the conversion count and a four
year statute for a breach of contract claim. Id. at 338. But for the existence of the contract,
the debtor-in-possession fared no better under Pennsylvania law than under§ 546(d). Id.
" 36 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. 1994).
" Id. at 72.
27
Id. at 73.
28
For a similar unnecessary reliance on§ 549(a), see Burns v. Shelton (In re Shelton), 273
B.R. 116 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002), rev'd sub nom Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Burns, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7553 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) .
29
251 B.R. 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) .
'° Id. at 200.
1
'
Id.
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32

conveyance of the house, in light of§ 550(d), which provides that
"the trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction." A better way to
put this is that, by retaining the proceeds (presumably with
bankruptcy court acquiescence), the trustee (and the court)
effectively ratified the debtor's unauthorized conveyance, thereby
permitting the buyers to stay in possession. Section 549(a) did not
apply because the conveyance was ratified after the fact.
A more complicated misuse occurs in United States v. Shaltry (In
33
re Home America T. V.-Appliance Audio, Inc.).
In this case, D was a
34
wholly owned subsidiary of P, the parent corporation. D had net
operating losses ("NOLs") that could have been used to generate a
tax refund in prior years. 35 D's creditors filed an involuntary
36
bankruptcy petition against D.
During the gap between the
bankruptcy petition and the "order for relief' (i.e., the adjudication
'
37
of bankruptcy), D and P entered into an agreement that
authorized P to file a consolidated return for the entire corporate
group. 38 As a result, D lost a refund from a prior year that would
have enriched D' s bankruptcy estate. P, however, paid fewer taxes.
After the order for relief, D's chapter 7 trustee sought to rescind the
39
agreement permitting a consolidated return. In connection with
this attempted rescission, the trustee filed an amended return for D,
40
which required the IRS to pay a refund into the bankruptcy estate.
Ultimately, the trustee's entitlement to this refund depended
on whether, during the "gap" period, D validly agreed to the
41
consolidated return. According to§ 303(£):
21

Notwithstanding section 363 of this title ,14 except to the exte nt that
the court orders otherwise, and until an order for relief in the case,
any business of the debtor may continue to operate, and the debtor
" Id. a t 205.
" 232 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2000) .
" Id. at 1048.
" Id. at 1048-49.
,. Id. a t. 1048.
" For information on adjudication of involun tary pe titio ns, see 11 U.S.C. § 303(h )
(2000) . In involuntary cases, the adjudicatio n is the time of the "order fo r relief." Id. In
voluntary cases, the pe tition itself is always the "orde r fo r relief." Id. § 301 .
,. In re Home America T V. -Ap,plianCI! Audio, Inc., 232 F.3d at 1049.
"' Id.

., Id.
"
"

Id. at 1050.
Section 363 describes whe n a bankruptcy trustee can use, sell, or lease property.
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may continue to use, acquire, or dispose of property as if an
involuntary case concerning the debtor had not been commenced.

The real question before the court was whether the agreement fell
43
within the operations of D's business. If not, then D's bankruptcy
trustee properly filed a new tax return justifying a refund payable to
D's bankruptcy estate.
The Home America court saw the trustee's theory as turning on
44
§ 549(a) avoidance. The new tax return, however, was filed more
than two years after the bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, the
trustee's § 549(a) action was time barred, and the IRS did not owe
45
the refund. If the statute of limitations in the Internal Revenue
Code had been applied, the trustee timely filed for the refund.
The assumptions made by the Home America court are
untenable. What property of D did the IRS receive? Arguably it
received tax payments from D years before, but these were hardly
"postpetition transfers." Nor did the IRS receive the NOL that D
should have used to reduce its own tax obligation. In fact, the IRS
was harmed because P "received" the NOL. Because P used the
NOL, the IRS received less revenue than it would have if P had filed
an unconsolidated return. The implication that, but for the statute
of limitations, the IRS had to pay ready cash to D's trustee because P
46
paid fewer taxes is, to say the least, acephalous. Nevertheless, the
court reached the right result for radically the wrong reasons.
Smith v. Mark Twain National Bank (In re Reidy Marketing Co./7 is
another case in which § 549(a) should have been omitted from the
discussion. In Reidy Marketing, D wired money to its bank and

" Russell v. United States (In re Russell), 927 F.2d 413,418 (8th Cir. 1991). The Russell
court was prepared to find the consolidated return a postpetition transfer of debtor property
within the meaning of§ 549(a). The only issue was whether the transfer was unauthorized as
being beyond the ordinary course of D's business. Id.
" 232 F.3d at 1050.
" Id. at 1051.
•• For another case holding that D's NOL is property of the bankruptcy estate, see
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 928 F.2d 565
(2d Cir. 1991) . In this case, an affiliate of D sought to take a "worthless stock" deduction
because D's stock was valueless. Id. at 567. The effect of the affiliate's deduction was that D
would lose its NOL tax attribute. Id. The Prudential Lines court viewed the affiliate's tax
deduction as an attack on property of the bankruptcy estate and therefore void under the
automatic stay. Id. at 574. Because the bankruptcy trustee relied on the automatic stay, not
§ 549(a), the statute of limitations apparently was not an issue. Id.
" 805 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1986) .
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48

obtained a certificate of deposit ("CD"). This occurred in the gap
between an involuntary petition and the order for relief. The bank
argued that the CD was collateral under a prepetition security
agreement, concededly a voidable postpetition security interest
under§ 549(a), but nevertheless not voidable because the statute of
49
limitations had run under § 549(d).
The Rei,dy Marketing court
agreed with all of the above, but also found that the bank was
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because it had, by
letter, promised to pay the CD shortly after the bankruptcy
adjudication. 50 In fact, the court should have ruled that a bank
51
cannot take a security interest in its own obligation to pay the CD.
Under state law, the bank had only a setoff right, but because
52
prepetition debt cannot be set off against postpetition debt, the
53
setoff right failed.
Any reference to § 549(a) in this case was
superfluous.
Sometimes a debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee
transfers property of the estate without court permission. Should
these transfers be viewed as valid but voidable, or are they simply
non-events? For instance, a debtor-in-possession might grant an
ultra vires mortgage or might pay attorneys without court
permission. Properly, these unauthorized conveyances are nullities
without any reference to avoidance. Rather, the third party in
possession of estate property must turn them over under § 542(a)
or, if the property has been converted to the third party's use, pay
the value under § 542(b). Such a view implies that the two year
statute of limitation in § 549 (d) is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the court in Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mango/,d, Tompert
& Chapman54 ruled that§ 549(a) avoidance was required to retrieve
55
unauthorized transfers.
This, in turn, implied a statute of
limitations. The Deckelbaum court was quick to find equitable tolling
..
"
"'

Id. at 293.

Id.
Id. at 294.
" See Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 596 F. Supp. 657, 663 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (vacated on other grounds); U.C.C. § 9-109(10) (2000).
" E.g., Fireman 's Fund Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. at 657.
" One bad implication of the Reidy Marketing opinion is that security agreements can
overrule§ 553(a), which requires that only countervailing prepetition debts may be set off.
' ' 275 B.R. 737 (D. Md. 2001).
" Id.; accord Garcia v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. (In re Garcia), 109 B.R. 335, 338
(N .D. Ill. I 989).
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of the statute of limitations. More to the point, § 549(a) was
irrelevant to the trustee's right to a turnover, as was the statute of
limitations in§ 549(d). 56
B.

Proper Applications

Section 549(a) has a valid purpose when someone is
57
empowered to convey free and clear of the trustee's lien.
Such
power may exist under state law or under federal bankruptcy law.
1.

Power Under State Law

Such a power may exist pursuant to nonbankruptcy law. For
example, suppose A has a prepetition security interest in D's
property. In spite of the bankruptcy petition, A holds a foreclosure
sale where Xis a buyer. Under state law, A has a pre-existing power
over D's equity interest at the time of the bankruptcy petition. The
trustee takes D's equity interest subject to A's power.
,. See Deckelbaum, 275 B.R. 737; see also Phoenix Amer. Life Ins. Co. v. Devan (In re
Merry-Go-Round Enterps., Inc.), 308 B.R. 237 (D. Md. 2004); Scharffenberger v. Billmore (In
re Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research Found.), 313 B.R. 673 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004). In the
author's opinion, both courts unnecessarily held unauthorized payment to require § 549(a)
avoidance.
57
A differing view is presented in Darrell W. Dunham, Postpetition Transfers in Bankruptcy,
39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1984) (denying§ 549(a) is a true avoidance power).
Some cases are on the borderline. For example, in Whitaker v. CIT Group/Equipment
Financing, Inc., 304 B.R. 255 (W.D.N.C. 2004), D granted a security interest to A in equipment
and then filed for bankruptcy in North Carolina. D then moved the equipment to New
Mexico. Id. at 257. Four months later, A's perfection lapsed thanks to former U.C.C. § 9103(d) (i) (1999). Id. After the lapse, D purporte d to sell the machines to X. Id. at 258.
Sensibly, the court ruled that bankruptcy freezes all priorities, so that A retained a valid
security interest and the bankruptcy trustee retained D's equity. Id. at 262. But some courts
are prepared to punish lapsed perfection in the name of punishing secret liens. E.g., Clark v.
Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Reliance Equities, Inc.), 966 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1992);
Expeditors Int'! of Wash. , Inc. v. Liquidating Trust (In re Schwinn Cycling & Fitness, Inc.), 313
B.R. 473 (D. Colo. 2004). If this punitive instinct prevails, could the trustee have avoided D's
postpetition transfer under§ 549(a)? Properly, no. Ifwe treat the bankruptcy trustee as a
judicial lien creditor only, this means that D continues to own equity even after the
bankruptcy petition. Carlson, supra note 1, at 552-53. In that case, D has power over the
equipment-power to convey good title to X. D has no power over the bankruptcy trustee 's
judicial lien; however, X does receive something when D conveys the machines-A's security
interest. But X cannot take free and clear of the bankruptcy trustee. Accordingly, X should
be subrogated to A's security interest and the equipment itself would still be part of the
bankruptcy estate. Notice that Xs security interest is unperfected but valid in D's bankruptcy
because the trustee has no avoidance theory from lapsed perfection. See GRANT GILMORE &
.DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECU RED LENDING§ 6.02[B] (2000).
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Especially if A has knowledge of the bankruptcy, A clearly
violates the automatic stay by holding a postpetition foreclosure
sale. 58 Putting the automatic stay aside for the moment, § 549(a)
becomes necessary to avoid a postpetition transfer by A to X
Continuing to leave automatic stay voidness aside, other
examples of power over the bankruptcy estate from state law might
be imagined. Suppose that at the time of bankruptcy D is the
holder of negotiable instruments or cash. Under state law, D has
the power to convey such items to a holder in due course, free and
clear of adverse interests. 59 Since the bankruptcy trustee is a judicial
lien creditor against such items, the trustee has an adverse interest
that D can destroy by due negotiation. For this reason, if D disposes
of cash after her bankruptcy petition, the trustee cannot pursue the
cash in the hands of transferees unless they knew of D's bankruptcy.
2.

Power Under§ 542(c)

The Bankruptcy Code empowers D and others to convey
property of the bankruptcy estate free and clear of the trustee.
According to§ 542(c):
601

Except as provided in section 362(a) (7)£ of this title, an entity that
has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the
commencement of the case concerning the debtor may transfer
property of the estate, or pay a debt owing to the debtor, in good
faith and other than in the manner specified in subsection (d) of this
611
section,r to an entity other than the trustee, with the same effect as

'" If A is ignorant of the bankruptcy petition, A arguably has an automatic stay defense
in§ 542(c) . But this proposition is controversial. See infra text accompanying notes 145-47.
One point may be raised that is perhaps obvious. Where A has a valid prepetition
security interest, A often moves to lift the automatic stay for lack of adequate protection, or
for want of equity or rehabilitative utility. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). If the stay is lifted, A is free
to exercise its power to the detriment of the bankruptcy estate. See id. But, when this power is
exercised, is not A transferring estate property in violation of§ 549(a) , and may not the
trustee avoid the sale? The answer must be that every lifting of the automatic stay implies an
authority to foreclose upon property of the estate. This implied authority must be what keeps
a subsequent foreclosure sale from violating§ 549. This should have been noted in § 549(a)
but was not.
59
u.c.c. § 3-306 (2002).
00
This provision prohibits the manifestation of postpetition setoffs. Such setoff rights,
however, are preserved for the benefit of the creditor, who is deemed a secured creditor in
the bankruptcy for the amount of the setoff. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) .
61
This subsection pertains to life insurance policies and is not relevant here.
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to the entity making such transfer or payment as if the case under this
title concerning the debtor had not been commenced.

Section 542(c) codifies Bank of Marin v. England," 2 where A, a
bank ignorant of the bankruptcy petition, honored D's prepetition
63
check made to Xs order.
Although the black letter of the
Bankruptcy Act required bank liability, Justice William 0. Douglas
found himself unable to "read these statutory words with the ease of
4
a computer.',i; He ruled that, given its ignorance of the bankruptcy
petition, A was not liable to pay the amount of postpetition checks
65
to the trustee.
Section 542(c), then, empowers D to write
prepetition or even p-.)stpetition checks on the trustee's bank
account where the payor bank is ignorant of the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Section 549(a), however, undoes what A has validly done under
§ 542(c). This is because § 549(a) authorizes the trustee to avoid
unauthorized conveyances or conveyances that are "authorized only
under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title." 66 Unless X has a
defense to§ 549(a), the trustee may force Xto give back what A has
validly transferred. 67
62

.,

385 U.S. 99 (1966) .
Id. at 100-01.

"' Id. at 103. Although the majority simply invented D's power to convey property of the
estate, and although a dissenting view by Justice Harlan chastised the majority for violating the
intent of Congress, id. at 106 (Harlan, J. dissenting), Congress later showed that the Bank of
Marin majority was just fine after all. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(c).
" Bank of Marin, 385 U.S. at 103.
66
11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(2)(A).
67
In the case of checks, the payor bank can honor the check and bear no liability. But
the payee has, provisionally, received estate funds and, pursuant to § 549(a), must return
them. See Clendenen v. Van Dyk Oil Co. (In re Buy-Rite Distrib. Co.), 89 B.R. 906 (D. Utah
1988). Defenses may exist, however. Oddly, had a prepetition check been given to a
merchant contemporaneous with the sale of goods, and had the check cleared prepetition,
the merchant payee could defend the payment as a technical voidable preference, but one
defended under the contemporaneous exchange defense of§ 547(c) (1). The Supreme Court
has ruled, however, that, for voidable preference purposes, checks are transfers of property
only when they are honored. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) . This holding has
been extended to postdate the transfer of bank funds until after the bankruptcy petition.
Wittman v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. (In re Mills) , 176 B.R. 924 (D. Kan. 1994); Franklin v. Kwik
Cash of Martin (In re Franklin), 254 B.R. 718 (W.D. Tenn. 2000). According to§ 362(b) (11) ,
an exception to the automatic stay exists for "the presentment of a negotiable instrument. " In
Mills, the court ruled that just because the presentment does not violate the automatic stay
does not mean that the presenter may keep the proceeds free and clear of the trustee's
avoidance right under§ 549(c). 176 B.R. at 928.
Under the Barnhill court's reasoning, when a debtor postdates the check, a transaction
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This analysis was followed in Dobin v. Presidential Financial Corp.
68
of Delaware Valley (In re Cybridge Corp.).
In Cybridge, D had a
prepetition "notification" factoring arrangement with X, whereby X
would advance eighty percent of the value of a receivable to D and
would receive payment directly from D's customers, who were told
to pay X 69 D filed for chapter 11 and became a debtor-inpossession.70 D neglected to tell X of the bankruptcy, and so X
71
continued to lend on D's postpetition receivables. Customers of D
took the position of A; they were authorized by § 542(c) to make
12
valid payments to X
Because the customers were empowered to
73
pay, X was empowered to receive those payments. Therefore, the
trustee genuinely had to bring a § 549(a) action against X to undo
what § 542(c) permits. The Cybridge court properly ignored the
automatic stay altogether.
One problem presented by Cybridge was that X, who was quite
innocent of the matter, had no apparent defense on the face of
§ 549 (a). X was a bona fide purchaser of receivables, but only bona
fide purchasers of real estate have a defense from § 549(a)
74
avoidance. The Cybridge court, however, hit upon a device to save
X from liability. Granted, the first receivable that came in was
recoverable from the trustee. But, subsequent thereto, X gave a new
75
advance to D for the next receivable. This was not a new loan, the

that would have been immune from voidable prefere nce attack is an invalid postpetition
transfer when a bankruptcy petition intervenes between the merchant's receipt and the
merchant's presentment of the check. 503 U.S. at 398-99. This is undoubtedly a very
questionable result.
A different kind of case is presented when D mails X a cashier's check prepetition , which
arrives postpetition. A cashier's check is not D's order to her bank to pay but rather is the
promise of a non-debtor bank to pay to the order of X. So conceived, it would appear that
when D mails prepetition, D has "delivered" it to X and has intended to make X the owner.
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and found the above transaction to be a postpetition
transfer of estate property. Mora v. Vasquez (In re Mora) , 199 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 1999).
Undoubtedly this would be correct for personal checks, but cashier's checks must be
conceived differently.
68
304 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D.NJ. 2004), affd, 312 B.R. 262 (D.NJ. 2004).
09
Id. at 684.
10
Id.
11

12

"
"
"

Id.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 691
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court reasoned. Rather, it was a return of the first receivable. Or,
78
to refine the court's theory somewhat, since X was not returning
the exact dollars earlier received, X must have converted those
79
funds to its own use and now owed money to D. The second loan
was therefore actually characterized as payment of the first tort
80
obligation X owed to D.
All advances to D were similarly
reconceived as payments for earlier wrongs. 81 Since X advanced to D
more than X received from the customers, Xs defense was
82
compete.
l
One defense against § 549(a) avoidance is the bona fide
purchase defense in§ 549(c). As we shall see, the Ninth Circuit, in
83
40235 Washington Street Corp. v. Lusardi, ruled that§ 549(c) is never
a defense to automatic stay voidness. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit
heavily emphasized the point that § 549(c) nowhere appears in
§ 362 (b), the section that catalogues exceptions to the automatic
84
stay. Yet neither is§ 542(c) listed in§ 362(b). If the Ninth Circuit
is correct that only the exceptions expressly listed in § 362(b) count
'"

Id. at 691-92.

n

Id.

" The court ruled that money is fungible, the return of new funds was, in effect, a
turnover of estate property. Id. In fact, money is not fungible. Every dollar is different, which
is why tracing is key in constructive trust cases.
"' Id.
"° Id. at 692.
" Id.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) ("The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under
subsection (a) of this section"). This recharacterization of Xs postpetition advances bears a
resemblance to a creditor's defense from voidable preference liability under § 547(c)(4).
Suppose a creditor has received a voidable preference. If the creditor gives back unsecured
new value, the new value constitutes a credit against the voidable preference liability. In
Cylmdge, advances were secured by additional postpetition receivables, but, as these were
voidable under§ 549(a), the advance could be considered genuinely unsecured. The same
result adheres under§ 547(c) (4); where the security interest is for whatever reason voidable,
the ostensibly secured advance can be considered the advance of unsecured new value.
GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 57, § 3.04[8].
Section 547(c) (4) has a very strict temporal requirement. First, the voidable prefere nce
must occur. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4). Then and only then the give-back must occur. Id. In
Cylmdge, the sequence seems to be more casual. For example, suppose X advanced funds on a
receivable on Monday. X advances new funds on Tuesday on a new receivable. On Friday, X
collects Monday's receivable. Since conversion of Monday's receivable only occured on
Friday, it is hard to see precisely how Tuesday's advance could be a "return" of the money
purloined on Friday. Making the Cylmdge result work in terms of timing would be a
formidab le accounting problem indeed.
" 329 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 1080.
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against automatic stay voidness, §542(c) must be viewed as
obliterated. Then Lusardi puts itself in contradiction with the
85
Supreme Court's Bank of Marin opinion. Lusardi's impact is
fundamental and far exceeds the negation of§ 549(c).
3.

Power Under § 303(/)

Another federal source of power to convey free and clear of the
bankruptcy estate is D's authority to dispose of property in the "gap"
between an involuntary proceeding and the actual adjudication of
bankruptcy. When D uses the power of § 303([) to dispose of
property of the estate, the trustee must avoid the transfer under
86
§ 549(a) . X, however, has a very broad defense under § 549(b).
Providing the transfer was not on Xs antecedent debt, the trustee
may not avoid any conveyance made by D under her§ 303([) power.
Just as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Lusardi implicitly wipes
out the§ 549(c) defense, it likewise wipes out the§ 549(b) defense.
If Lusardi's logic is pushed to its conclusion , the trustee can undo
any gap transaction of the debtor because it violates the automatic
stay. For instance, suppose D sells inventory to X, a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, in the involuntary gap period. The
sales contract is Xs "act to obtain possession of property of the
estate"87 in violation of the automatic stay. Of course, D was
authorized by § 303([) to sell to X.
Yet § 303([) is nowhere
referenced in § 362(b) .
Lusardi, which asserts that the only
exceptions to the automatic stay are those listed in § 362 (b), directly
threatens Bankruptcy Code governance of the involuntary gap.
Obviously, the scope of automatic stay voidness is of the greatest
sigr,ificance, and so to this subject we must now turn.

"

Bank of Marin v. England , 385 U .S. 99 ( 1966).
According to thi s provisio n ,
(b) In an invo lunta1-y case, the trustee may not avoid under subsectio n (a) of this
sec tio n a transfe r m ade afte r the comme n ce me nt o f such case but before the o rder
fo r relief to the exte nt any value , including se rvices, but no t including satisfactio n
or se curing of a d ebt th at arose before the comme nceme nt of the case, is given
afte r th e comme nce me nt of th e case in excha nge for such transfe r,
no twithstanding any no tice or knowledge of the case that the transfe ree h as.
" 11 U.S. C. § 362 (a) (3).
86
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THE AUTOMATIC STAY

On the surface, there appears to be a conflict between § 362 and
88
§ 549.

Case law has produced an alternative avoidance theory inspired
by the automatic stay. According to purely judge-made law, acts in
violation of it are void or perhaps voidable. This concept stems
from the notion that equity views as done what ought to be done.89
In the case of the automatic stay, the instinct takes a negative turn:
Equity views as not done what ought not to be done.
As with§ 549(a), if no one has a power to convey property of
the bankruptcy estate once the petition is filed, then any reference
to automatic stay voidness is superfluous.
If D's postpetition
conveyances are ''void," they are not so because of the stay. They are
void simply because D has no power to convey property free and
clear of the trustee's lien. The point is not just an academic one.
The automatic stay can be annulled retroactively. 90 In contrast, a
bankruptcy court has no general discretion to renounce the
trustee's ownership because someone with no power over property
91
of the estate purported to convey it away.
The matter changes if D or A has power to convey away the
trustee's property, whether under state law, § 542(c), or § 303(f).
Only when D or A operates under one of these powers does it make
sense to refer to automatic stay voidness. Yet this serves only to
exacerbate the point-a judge-made rule is being used to erase
powers expressly created by Congress.
Be that as it may, much judicial effort has been wasted trying to
figure out whether acts in violation of the automatic stay are "void "92
" Shaw v. County of San Bernardino (In re Shaw) , 157 B.R. 151, 152 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1993).
" See Meddaugh v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 333, 346 (1894) ("It is a cardinal rule of equity that
it assumes that that is done which ought to be done .... ").
90
Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881F.2d176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989) .
1
•
Ratification of transfers under §§ 363(b) or 364 would be exceptions. Here, if the
trustee purports to convey estate property, the court is invited to ratify the trustee's
unauthorized act after the fact. 2 GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 57, § 26.08.
" This is how the Supreme Court first put it. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438
(1940) ("But if appellants are right in their contention that the federal Act of itself, from the
moment the petition was filed and so long as it remained pending, operated, in the absence
of the bankruptcy court's consent, to oust the jurisdiction of the state court so as to stay its
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or merely "voidable."93 By themselves, the words "void" and
"voidable" distinguish between what is actual and what is potential.
Paradoxically, the "void" act is actually so94-already negated,
95
without any affirmative action by the trustee. A merely "voidable"
action has positive existence for the moment, and contains the
potential of negation; the trustee, however, must come forward and
actually make negative what is for the moment positive but
potentially negative.
In choosing between the actually void and the possibly
96
voidable, some courts note that the automatic stay can be annulled.
Annulment must mean that an act allegedly in violation of the stay is
curable. If so, it must not be entirely void. Annulment, then, points
toward "voidable."97
Other courts protest that, if an act in violation of the automatic
stay is merely "voidable," and if a trustee does nothing to avoid it,
the act becomes valid after bankruptcy. Fearing that wrongdoers
will get away with murder under such a view, these courts proclaim
98
acts in violation of the stay to be non-events ab initio. Treating a
conveyance in violation of the stay as void shifts the burden to the
99
wrongdoer to validate what is otherwise an actual non-event.

power to proceed with foreclosure, to confirm a sale, and to issue an order ejecting appellants
from their farm, the action of the Walworth County Court was not merely erroneous but was
beyond its power, void, and subject to collateral attack."). Of course, if the state court's action
is subject to collateral attack, it must be something more than void prior to that attack.
" One court recently suggested that the choice is "between 'void' /'voidable,' on the
one hand, and 'avoidable,' on the other." Ford v. Loftin (In re Ford), 296 B.R. 537, 546
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003) (emphasis omitted) .
94
This is an oddly Hegelian notion-what is actual is the disappearance of appearance.
See generally JOHN F. HOFFMEYER, THE ADVENT OF FREEDOM: THE PRESENCE OF THE FUTURE IN
HEGEL'S LOGIC ( 1994) (explicating Hegel's actuality) .
95
Sikes, 881 F.2d at 178 ("By strict definition that which is void is nugatory and of no
effect and cannot be cured; that which is voidable may be either voided or cured.").
"' 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
" Sikes, 881 F.2d at 178 ("The power to annul authorizes retroactive relief even unto the
date of the filing of the petition giving rise to the automatic stay. The power to annul
authorizes the court to validate actions taken subsequent to the impressing of the section
362(a) stay."); In re Williams, 257 B.R. 297,301 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re Olive r, 38 B.R.
245,248 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) .
98
40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 329 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Schwartz v.
United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569,571 (9th Cir. 1992) .
99
See Soares v. Brockton Credit Union (In re Soares) , 107 F.3d 969, 976 (1st Cir. 1997);
Donna Renee Tobar, The Need for a Uniform Void Ab Initio Standard for Violations of the Automatic
Stay, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 25 (2002); Timothy Arnold Barnes, Note, The Plain Meaning of the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: The Void/Voidable Distinction Revisited, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 291, 315-16
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In truth, the semantics of negativity has proven unhelpful in
100
working out the ultimate law of the automatic stay.
Even courts
stuck with "voidable" have found that actions in violation of the stay
10 1
are simply "void" without any further action by the trustee.
Courts
102
that embrace "void " nevertheless find actions curable.
Casting aside the semantic debate, a point must be emphasized,
and emphasized strongly. The voidness doctrine nowhere appears
in the Bankruptcy Code. It is strictly judge-made- the extension of
a principle of equity, which holds as (not) done what ought (not) to
be done. The Supreme Court has decreed that general principles
of equity not be used to overcome express provisions of the
103
Bankruptcy Code.
I suggest this is precisely what happened in the
Lusardi case, where the Ninth Circuit used automatic stay voidness,
an equitable doctrine, to erase the bona fide purchaser defense in
§ 549(c) . This is not to say that the voidness doctrine is wrong. It is
only to say that it should stop short of eliminating provisions like
§ 303([), § 542(c) , or § 549(b) -(d). But since these provisions

(1996).
Li fting th e auto matic stay does no t inhere ntly cure acts take n earlie r in violatio n of it.
In Soares, A sued to fore close a mortgage and requested a judgme nt of fo reclosure fro m state
court. In re Soares, 107 F.3d at 972. Before the court could act, D filed for bankruptcy. Id.
Th e court, ignoran t of the bankruptcy, e ntered a judgme nt of d efault. A the n moved to lift
the stay. Id. The mo tio n was granted . Id. A he ld a fo reclosure sale whe re A was the buyer.
Id. Wo rried abo ut the voidness of the judgme nt of fo reclosure, A move d for re troactive re lief.
Id. A se rve d papers o n D's atto rney, but not on D. Id. The bankruptcy court granted
re troactive relief. Id. With new co unsel, D moved the bankruptcy court to re consider the
grant of retroactive relie f and to avoid the foreclosure sale. Id. The bankruptcy court denied
D's mo tio ns. Id. at 972-93. T he court of appeals, however, reversed , ruling that it was an
abuse of discre tio n to grant annulme nt to A, where A knew of the bankruptcy· proceeding and
failed to warn the state court that a default judgment wo uld viola te the automatic stay. Id. at
978. Appare ntly, A should have re turned to the state court after the stay was lifted so that a
p roper default judgment could be entered .
00
'
This is so as the Sixth Circuit recognized, in suggesting the phrase "invalid" but
curable. Easley v. Pe ttibo ne Mich . Corp ., 990 F.2d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 1993); see also In re
Abusaad , 309 B.R. 895, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004 ) ("One must no t bog down too much in
the 'vo id ' v. 'voidable' contest. Regardless of the labe l placed o n the effect of an ac ti on taken
in vio latio n of the stay, it is clear that such an action is invalid and of no effect unless and until
the ac tio n is made valid by subsequent judicial actio n annulling the automati c stay.") .
'°' Elbar lnvs., Inc. v. Pierce (In re Pie rce), 272 B.R. 198, 205-20 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2001 ) .
102
.
In re Schwartz., 954 F.2d at 573.
'°' United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 536 (1996) (holding courts may no t use
equitable subordinatio n to amend the express statu tory prio rities in the Bankruptcy Code);
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197,206 (1988) (" [W]hatever equi table powe rs
remain in the bankruptcy cou rts must and can o nly be exercised within the confines of the
Bankrup tcy Code .").
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nearly exhaust the possibilities for postpetition transfers valid
against the trustee, we can summarize by saying that, insofar as the
Bankruptcy Code is concerned, automatic stay voidness is
completely inappropriate in any case involving a postpetition
transfer.
III. DEFENSES
Postpetition avoidance presupposes a power in D or A to
dispose of the bankruptcy estate in spite of the trustee's property
rights in the bankruptcy estate. When this power exists, the trustee
must affirmatively avoid the transfer under § 549(a) alone. Any
assertion of automatic stay voidness eliminates the role of§ 549(a)
from the Bankruptcy Code.
There are at least five defenses to § 549(a) avoidance. But do
they also constitute defenses to automatic stay voidness, if that
doctrine is insisted upon? Two defenses exist to the automatic
stay. 104 Are these also defenses to § 549(a) avoidance? On this the
courts are sharply divided. In my view, every defense should apply
everywhere against § 549(a) avoidance and automatic stay voidness.
The court-made doctrine of voidness should not be permitted to
eclipse any express provision of the Bankruptcy Code protecting
postpetition transferees.
A.

Bona Fide Purchases of Real Estate

Section 549(c) is the defense which, I maintain, the Ninth
Circuit has written out of the Bankruptcy Code in 40235 Washington
Street Corp. v. Lusardi, 105 together with § 303(f) and § 542(c).
According to § 549 (c) :
The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) ... a transfer of real
property to a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the
commencement of the case and for present fair equivalent value
unless a copy or notice of the petition was filed, where a transfer of
such real property may be recorded to perfect such transfer, against
whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, could not
acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of such good faith

104
10
'

11 U.S.C. § 362.
329 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2003).
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purchase.
A good faith purchaser without knowledge of the
commencement of the case and for less than present fair equivalent
value has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any
present value given, unless a copy or notice of the petition was so
106
filed before such transfer was so perfected.

Because § 549(c) is a defense, it is applicable only if the trustee
needs to avoid a conveyance. The trustee only needs to avoid a
conveyance if someone has the power, under state law or the
Bankruptcy Code, to make the conveyance. Then, and only then, is
it ever necessary to invoke§ 549(a) and (c).
For the classic example of a§ 549(c) defense, suppose D grants
a valid mortgage on real estate to A. In spite of the automatic stay, A
107
108
sells to X, who is a bona fide
purchaser for "present fair
109
equivalent value" within the meaning of § 549(c) . Here is a
106
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the power of D to convey the trustee 's real estate to
bona fide purchasers did no t exist if the real estate was located in the same county where the
bankruptcy court was located . Tavormina v. Brummer (In re Centre de Tricots de Gaspe) , 782
F.2d 905,907 (llth Cir. 1986); Dunham, supra note 57, a t 8~7.
10
'
According to some courts, if X has reason to know of D's bankruptcy, X cannot be a
good faith purchaser. Szybist v. McKean County Tax Claim Bureau (In re Taft), 262 B.R. 55,
61 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001); D'Alfonso v. A.RE.I. Inv. (In re D'Alfonso) , 2ll B.R. 508, 513
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) . Of course, anyone who allows property taxes to go on unpaid is a
likely candidate for bankruptcy, so that the Taft court is perilously close to saying that Xis on
inquiry notice of D's bankruptcy. That is, Xis charged with the knowledge of a successful
inquiry if X makes no inquiry at all.
108
A purchaser must also record the foreclosure deed. Commonwealth Mortg. Co. of
Am. v. Konowitz (In re Konowitz), 905 F.2d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Cal. Mort. Serv.
(In re Walker), 861 F.2d 597,600 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Ward, 837 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1988) ; In re
Major, 218 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998); see also William J. Rochelle III & Gwen
Feder, Unauthorized Sales of a Debtur's Property: The Rights of a Purchaser Under Section 549 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 23, 45-46 (1983). According to the text of§ 549(c), if D
files notice of the bankruptcy in the real estate records before X "perfects," X cannot claim the
defense of§ 549(c).
In Ward, Xwas bona fide but had not perfected. 837 F.2d at 125. But neither had the
bankruptcy trustee filed notice of the bankruptcy in the local real estate records. See id.
Because bona fides are properly tested at the moment of investment (not the moment of
recordation), it should still have bee n open for X to perfect and preserve his defense. Section
549(c) does not exactly say that X must perfect. It says only that the defense depends on the
fact that no bankruptcy pe tition has been recorded in the real estate records prior to
perfection. Id. at 126. Apparently, where neither side has recorded, the defense is tentatively
valid, according to§ 549(c)'s literal meaning, though the parties are in a "race to the court
ho use." Id. at 126-27. If the trustee wins the race, the defense is destroyed.
All of this is acephalous. Given that A's mortgage is of record , why does it matter if X
records or not, so long as Xis in good faith at the time of purchase?
109
Some courts have read "present fair equivalent value" to mean bid-in buyers are
excluded. Shaw v. County of San Bernardino (In re Shaw), 157 B.R. 151, 154 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
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genuine case in which X should prevail because A had a valid power
over the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, it is sometimes held that
this same transaction violates the automatic stay. If X's deed is void
or voidable for this reason, then the trustee recaptures the conveyed
property under§ 542(a) without any reference to§ 549(a) or (c).
We have before us an acephalous moment. In fact, § 549(c)
should be a defense to the automatic stay-part of§ 362(b)-as well
as a defense to§ 549(a) avoidance. It was not listed as an exception
in§ 362(b), and this has motivated the Ninth Circuit, in a sublimely
egregious case, to rule that, where the automatic stay has been
violated, § 549(c) never helps a bona fide purchaser at a
11 0
postpetition foreclosure sale.
In Lusardi, D, a newly created entity, bought real estate
111
encumbered by superpriority tax liens.
It promptly made a bad
11 2
faith bankruptcy filing.
Although the county had received a faxed
copy of D's bankruptcy petition, it nevertheless held a foreclosure
sale where X was the buyer. X had no knowledge of the bankruptcy.
11 3
Later, the county refused to issue a deed to X.
D filed notice of
the bankruptcy proceeding in the county real estate records, and
114
soon thereafter D's chapter 11 proceeding was dismissed.
1993) ; In re Major. 218 B.R. at 505; Purnell v. Citicorp Homeowners Servs., Inc. (In re Purnell),
92 B.R. 625, 630 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ; In re Powers, 88 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988) .
Other courts, borrowing from BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), have ruled
that any price received at a courHmpervised foreclosure sale is per se fair equivalent value.
T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In reT.F. Stone Co.), 72 F.3d 466, 470-72 (5th Cir. 1995). But see In
re D'Alfonso, 211 B.R. at 513 (BFPis limited to mortgage foreclosures of real estate). Still other
courts impose on X the burden of showing that the price paid was actually fair. Ford v. Loftin
(In re Ford) , 296 B.R. 537, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003). For an argument against extending
BFP to § 549( c) cases, see Janet A. Flaccus, Pre-Petition and Post-Petition Mortgage Foreclosures and
Tax Sales and the Faulty Reasoning of the Supreme Court, 51 ARK. L. REV. 25 (1998). Prior to the
1984 amendments, buyers at ".judicial sales" were protected whether or not they paid value.
Rochelle & Feder, supra note 108, at 49-51.
0
"
Lusardi, 329 F.3d at 1080.
"' Id. at 1078.
'" The owners of D suffered from the "new debtor syndrome"-formation of an entity
for the sole purpose of placing it in bankruptcy proceedings. See id.; see also Udall v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Nursery Land Dev., Inc.), 91 F.3d 1414, 1415 (10th Cir. 1996);
Laguna Assoc. Ltd . v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Laguna Assoc. Ltd.), 30 F.3d 734, 738 (6th
Cir. 1994). For a case awarding sanctions against an attorney for filing a "new debtor" chapter
11 petition, see In re St. Stephen's 350 E. 116th St., 313 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
'" Presumably the county feared issuance of the deed was a violation of the automatic
stay. But see Rodgers v. County of Monroe (In re Rodgers), 333 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding where bankruptcy petition followed foreclosure sale, issuance of deed after
bankruptcy did not violate automatic stay).
114
According to the district court, the bankruptcy court dismissed the chapter 11
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Immediately after the bad faith dismissal, X commenced a
115
"quiet title" action in state court.
D responded with a federal
complaint, alleging that X had no title because the foreclosure sale
was "void" for violating the automatic stay. 116 In the federal action, X
117
successfully obtained an abstention order.
The state court then
ruled that X had no title because of automatic stay voidness. 11 8 X
responded by finally answering D's federal complaint. Although res
judicata should have applied, the District Court nevertheless
reached the merits and decided for D. Finding that§ 549(c) is an
inherent exception to the automatic stay, the District Court found
that X did not qualify for the defense for two reasons. First, X never
recorded a deed and so did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser
119
within the meaning of § 549(c).
Second, X paid too little to
120
constitute a "present fair equivalent value. "
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that § 549(c) could never
be a defense when automatic stay voidness was the operative
12 1
theory.
The Ninth Circuit observed that bona fide purchase
under § 549(c) is not mentioned in § 362(b), and therefore the
§ 549(c) defense could not be asserted against automatic stay
122
"voidness. "
proceeding because D "had no viable reorganization plan." 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi,
177F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2001) .
11
'
Id. at 1095, 1107.
11
'
Id. at 1095.
117
40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 976 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1992) .
11 8
177 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 ("In 1996, the California Court of Appeals heard Lusardi's
suit against Washington Stree t. The court, relying on the Ninth Circuit's Schwartz opinion,
held that Lusardi's tax deed was void, not voidable.") . Here the court refers to In re Schwartz,
954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1991) .
119
See supra notes 105-110.
120
11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (2000). The last sentence of § 549(c) reads: "A good faith
purchase r without knowledge of the commencement of the case and for less than present fair
equivalent value has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any present value
given, unless a copy or notice of the petition was so filed before such transfer was so
perfected." X could not prevail under this section because D filed notice of the bankruptcy
before X did.
121
40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 329 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003).
1
"
Id.; see also In re Ward, 837 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1988); Ford v. Loftin (In re Ford), 2003
Bankr. LEXIS 902, at *21 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2003); Glendenning v. Third Fed. Sav.
Bank (In re Glendenning), 243 B.R. 629, 633-34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); Smith v. London (In
re Smith) , 224 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998); In re Powers, 88 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1988) . The court in Elbar Investments, In c. v. Pierce (In re Pierce) , 272 B.R. 198, 205-20 (Bankr.
S.D . Tex. 2001), so held, even in the teeth of In re T.F. Stone Co., 72 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Stone, a county with a tax lien made a postpetition foreclosure sale to itself as buyer. In re
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I contend that, by this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit wrote not
just§ 549 out of the Bankruptcy Code, but§ 303(£) and § 542(a) as
well, suffocating these sections in the powerful vacuum of automatic
stay voidness. By so doing, it allowed a judge-made rule to cancel
the express statutory commands of Congress.
Anticipating this critique, the Lusardi court asserted that it left
legitimate ground on which§ 549(a) could stand. According to the
court, " [t] he purpose of section 549 . . . is to provide a just
resolution when the debtor himself initiates an unauthorized
postpetition transfer. "123 Yet, based on what has been said, it should
T.F. Stone Co., 72 F.3d at 467. It successfully asserted a § 549(c) defense against a § 549(a)
avoidance action. Id. at 472. The Elbar court found Stone to be inapposite because the trustee
in Stone did not assert an automatic stay theory. 272 B.R. at 205 ("Nowhere in Stone is there
any indication that the forced sale in that case violated Bankruptcy Code § 362. The d ecision
does not indicate whether.the creditor had obtained relief from the automatic stay or whether
the tax sale in question simply was not prohibited by the stay for some other reason .") . In an
accompanying footnote, Judge Steen speculated, "[t)he stay might not have applied to the
property or might have terminated by operation of law." Id. at 205 n.11. Yet logically the
automatic stay must have been there. If the automatic stay had been lifted, then the taxing
authority was authorized to sell. If the stay had e nded because the proceeding had ended,
then the trustee could not have had a § 549(a) theory to assert. The statute of limitations
terminates the trustee's cause of action once the bankruptcy case is closed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 549(d) (2) . It has been suggested that Stone involved postpetition property tax liens, the
creation of which did not violate the automatic stay. In re D'Alfonso, 211 B.R. 508, 518
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(ll). This is wrong for two reasons. First, prior
to 1994, postpe tition property tax liens were void under the automatic stay. City of
Farmersbranch v. Pointer (In re Pointer) , 952 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1992). The 1994 amendments,
which added § 362(b) (11 ), did not apply to the case. Second, even if attachment did not
violate the stay, the foreclosure sale sure ly did. Therefore, this suggestion must be rejected.
Notice Stone is not a case where§ 542(c) applies, because A had no prepetition power to
sell D's property. A's lien arose strictly postpetition. In fact, it would appear that in the Fifth
Circuit, Stone establishes the§ 549(c) defense against an automatic stay theory.
Confusingly, in Lilly v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Natchez Corp.), 953 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1992) , the Fifth Circuit seemed to suggest that the only remedy for undoing a
postpetition transfer was§ 549(a) -not the automatic stay. More narrowly, Natchez holds tha t
a private creditor has no standing to undo a postpetition transfer under§ 549. Id. at 187.
12
'
329 F.3d at l 081. Judge Reinhart picks up a point made in In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569
(9th Cir. 1991) :
[A) straightforward analysis of section 549 reveals that it is not intended to cover
the same type of actions prohibited by the automatic stay nor re ndered moot by
section 362's voiding of all automatic stay violations. Section 549 applies to
unauthorized transfers of estate property which are not otherwise prohibited by the
Code. In most circumstances, section 549 applies to transfers in which the debtor is
a willing participant ....
Section 362's automatic stay does not apply to sales or transfers of prope rty
initiated by the debtor. Thus, section 549 has a purpose in bankruptcy beyond the
potential overlap with section 362. In other words, the automatic stay can void any
violation and still leave section 549 with a valid and important role in bankruptcy.
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be apparent that, except for involuntary cases, where § 303(£)
empowers D to dispose of property prior to the bankruptcy
adjudication, or perhaps in cases involving commercial paper, D
never has power to convey property free and clear of the trustee's
lien. The ground reserved for § 549(a) is almost a null set.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit is guilty of largely reading § 549(a)
straight out of the Bankruptcy Code.
Because a debtor has power under § 303 (f) to convey property
free and clear of the trustee's lien,§ 549(a) has a utility, but is it one
limited to involuntary gap cases? Such a claim must fail. Any
attempt by D to use her § 303 (f) power constitutes a violation of the
automatic stay-an act to "exercise control over property of the
estate. "124 Furthermore, X violates the stay by receiving property of
125
the estate.
Since the premise in Lusardi is that all acts are barred
unless specifically mentioned in § 362 (b), Ninth Circuit logic
requires the absolute erasure of § 303 (f). This cannot be given as
126
an example of genuine territory in which§ 549 might still operate.
At best, § 549 has utility only in commercial paper cases.
Section 549 exists as a protection for creditors against unauthorized d ebtor
transfers of estate property. Although there are circumstances where section 362
overlaps section 549 and renders it unnecessary, this overlap falls far short of
rendering section 549 meaningless . ...
Id. at 573-74 (citations omitted) .
124
11 U.S.C.§362(a)(3).
"'

Id.
If Lusardi is wrong, then X may assert the defen se of§ 549(c). This may mean that A
has violated the automatic stay, but the trustee has no remedy against X. What are the
trustee's rights against A?
It can be observed without controversy that, first, A has received proceeds of estate
property, which it holds in trust for the bankruptcy trustee. II U.S.C. § 541 (a) (6).
Accordingly, the trustee needs no adversary proceeding under§ 549(a). Rather, the trustee
can effectuate a turnover under § 542(a) if the dollars can be traced. If not, the trustee can
sue for the tort of conversion and recover this in personam claim under § 542 (b).
Second, it sho uld be clear that since A has violated the automatic stay, sanctions are
appropriate. What those sanctions might be would bring the present endeavor too far off
course. On sanctions awardable for stay violations, see D. Casey Kobi , Note, Staying True to
Purpose: Including Corporate Debtors Under Section 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 76 IND. LJ.
243 (2001); David Swarthout, Note, When Is an Individual a Corporation?-When the Court
Misinterprets a Statute, That's When, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151 (2000) . The remedy,
however, does not include forfeiture of A 's security interest in the proceeds themselves. This
was the holding of fleet National Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), Nos. 02-40100 & 0240101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4876 (D. Mass. March 28, 2003), a case of special interest to the
current article for reasons beyond its holding on forfeitures. See infra text accompanying
notes 152-58. For the present, however, this case can be read as involving an Article 9 secured
creditor that applied postpetition cash proceeds to a prepetition secured claim in violation of
126
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Subrogation

Even if, per Lusardi, the § 549(c) defense has been consigned
to the memory hole, courts following that opinion should be
sensitive to the separate concept of subrogation. Suppose A
purports to sell to X in violation of the automatic stay and, per
Lusardi, the § 549 (c) defense does not apply. X might nevertheless
be subrogated to A's valid prepetition security interest. It should
always be true that, even if X has bought nothing from the
bankruptcy estate, X has, at least, bought A's senior position under
127
ordinary principles of subrogation.
Nothing in the automatic stay
128
prevents A from selling her claim to X.
This point was missed in Lusardi where D, a bad faith filer, won
a judgment of clean title against X. Subrogation would have
mitigated this result. Although X could not qualify for a § 549(c)
defense because A refused to tender a deed after the auction, the
court might have held that X was subrogee to the county's lien on
D's property. As it was, D not only had the advantage of the
automatic stay in spite of a bad faith filing, but D was able to foist a
tax liability over to X in addition. The fruit of D's bad faith was
129
therefore a fresher start than good faith debtors get.
Subrogation was likewise overlooked in Burns v. Shelton (In re
Shelton), 130 a chapter 7 case in which A obtained relief from the stay.
the automatic stay. The Bankvest court reversed what it took to be a forfeiture order, but, in
remanding, it held open the possibility of other sanctions.
The trustee may wish to argue that A's sale to X destroyed valuable debtor equity where
X did not pay full value. But many courts insist that Xs defense depends on X paying the full
fair value. See supra notes 111-122. Where such a view is followed, the trustee 's dilemma never
arises.
127
Roslyn Sav. Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re Comcoach Corp.), 698 F.2d 571, 574
(1983). This is the standard state law solution to the circumstance in which A has failed to
join a necessary party in a foreclosure proceeding and has nevertheless sold to X. X buys A's
position and must redo the foreclosure properly, joining the previously excluded necessary
party. Pease Co. v. Huntington Nat'! Bank, 495 N.E.2d 45 (1985). But see In re Ward, 837 F.2d
124 (3d Cir. 1988) .
'" On the postpetition market for secured claims, see Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas
Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Ccnporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. l (1990).
129
It appears, however, that Xis entitled to a refund from the county holding the illegal
foreclosure sale. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE§ 3729 (2001). Presumably, upon refunding the
tax, the county would have a lien on D's property again. If so, then perhaps D will not
ultimately escape its proper tax obligation.
''° 273 B.R. 116 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002), rev'd sub nomPeoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Burns,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 7553 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2004) .
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Lifting the stay permitted A to foreclose, but it did not mean that
the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned debtor equity. The equity
was still property of the estate, and D had no power over it.
Nevertheless, without authority, D made a quitclaim deed to X1 who
granted a mortgage on the same land to X2• X 1 used the proceeds
from X/ s loan to pay A.
This seems to have been a proper case for subrogation. In
effect, X 1 and X2 "bought" A's senior lien. The Shelton court did not
see it this way. Rather, it ruled that the bankruptcy estate could
13 1
have the property free and clear of X 1 and X 2 •
First, it wrongly
132
viewed the case to be a§ 549(a) avoidance case instead of a case in
which D failed to convey property he had no right to convey.
Second, the court viewed X/s attempted defense as one under
133
§ 550(e).
Section 550(e) allows for a lien on property for the
value of "improvements" if the trustee seeks to recover under
§ 550(a). The court ruled that if the trustee could avoid the
conveyance to X1 under § 549(a), such a lien was preserved for the
134
benefit of the bankruptcy estate under § 551.
Section 550(e)
cannot serve as a defense to § 551. 135 For this reason, the trustee's
§ 549(a) action was vindicated, though in truth § 549(a) was
irrelevant to the matter. Regardless of§ 550(e), however, X 1 and X2
should have prevailed on a theory of subrogation. 136 The trustee
should have title to the property subject to the superior lien of X 1
and X2 •
Subrogation is a basic part of the common law of payment. As
such, it has nothing to do with the § 549(c) defense. Accordingly,
'"
l!\z

133

Id. at 123.
Id. at 118.

Id. at 121.
Id.
'" Accord Suhar v. Burns (In re Burns), 322 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2003).
t:ffi
In Shelton, X2 claimed an earmarking defense. The court was justifiably mystified by
this claim, because earmarking is a voidable preference term. In re Shelton, 273 B.R. at 122-23.
In earmarking, D borrows from C,, an unsecured creditor, to pay C,, also an unsecured
creditor. Dis bankrupt soon thereafter. See generally David Gray Carlson & William H. Widen ,
The Eannarking Defense to Voidab/,e Preference Liability: A Reconceptualization, 72 AM. BANKR. LJ.
591 (1999) (recharacterizing earmarking as the § 547(c)(l) defense in disguise). It is
sometimes said that C, has not received a preference because the dollars received were C,'s
property. It appears, then , that "earmarking" was an inelegant attempt to assert a subrogation
theory, which the Shelton court might well have honored in order to prevent unjust
enrichment of the bankruptcy estate. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
for a determination of whether the estate was diminished by X,'s payment. Presumably, on
the next try, the bankruptcy court will see the merits of the subrogation theory.
134

2004]

Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment

139

subrogation should always be available to aid the purchaser of
137
personal property at a lien foreclosure sale.
2.

Dismissals of the Bankruptcy Proceeding

Subrogation also helps mitigate the situation when, as in
Lusardi, the bankruptcy proceeding engendering the automatic stay
is dismissed for bad faith. Suppose Lusardi is rejected as bad law, so
that the trustee must always avoid postpetition transfers under
§ 549 (a), if she can. Dismissal, whether for bad faith or by D's
choice, is governed by Bankruptcy Code§ 349(b), which states:
(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case
other than under section 742 of this title( 1) reinstates
(B) any transfer avoided under section ... 549 ... of this title;
and
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered under
section ... 550 ... of this title; and
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the
case under this title.

Notice that conveyances "avoided" under§ 549 are revived. Under
Lusardi, however, conveyances are void for violating the automatic
stay and therefore are not resuscitated. Accordingly, courts hold
138
that "void" conveyances stay void, even after a bad faith dismissal.
It is important to note that, if Xis A's subrogee, X can always
return to the bankruptcy court, reopen the bankruptcy case, and
obtain retrospective annulment of the automatic stay, thereby

"' For a case ruling out subrogation (which the above-mentioned defense closely
resembles) in a strong-arm situation where a loan from an unperfected secured party retired a
perfected security interest, see Farmer v. LaSal/,e Bank (In re Morgan), 291 B.R. 795 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2003). Some courts have ruled that§ 547 overrules any concept of subrogation. See,
e.g., Boyd v. Superior Bank FSB (In re Lewis), 270 B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001);
Sheehan v. Valley Nat'l Bank (In re Shreves), 272 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2001).
But see Hardesty v. Equity One Credit Corp. (In re Farrell), 269 B.R. 181, 187-88 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2001) (alternative holding stating unperfected mortgagee had § 550(e) (1) defense for
funds paid to prior perfected mortgagee).
1
"
In reD'Alfonso, 211 B.R. 508,513 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
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139
reviving the entire foreclosure sale.
Even voidness theory admits
140
that a supposedly ''void" conveyance can be cured.
Retroactive relief from the automatic stay is sometimes granted
141
just to vindicate the rights of a bona fide purchaser.
But courts
wedded to the Lusardi position have begun to insist that retroactive
relief to undercut the Lusardi premise is per se illegitimate. One
such holding can be found in Fje/,dsted v. Lien (In re Fje/,dsted). 142 Yet
Fje/,dsted involved a good faith chapter 13 case that was never
dismissed. Where, however, a bankruptcy proceeding has already
been dismissed on grounds of bad faith, it is presumptively
monstrous not to annul the automatic stay to vindicate the rights of
• hl43 pure h aser. 144
a goo d f:a1t
B.

The Meaning of§ 54 2(c)

As we have seen, where§ 542(c) applies, A validly conveys free
and clear of the automatic stay. Of course, Lusardi overrules this

,,. See Jones v. Garcia (In re Jones) , 63 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Albany Partners, Ltd. v.
Westbrook (In re Westbrook) , 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Dupuy, 308 B.R. 843
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2004); In re Batton, 308 B.R. 406 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (auction held
fifteen minutes after bankruptcy petition); Litzler v. CitiCapital Comm. Corp. (In re TIC
United Corp.), 304 B.R. 270 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1990).
140
InreSoares , 107F.3d969,976 (lstCir.1997) .
141
See In re Jones, 63 F.3d 411 ; Little v. Bago (In re Sago) , 149 B.R. 610 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1993); New Orleans Airport Motel Assocs., Ltd. v. Lee (In re Servico, Inc.), 144 B.R. 933
(Bankr. S.D . Fla 1992) .
142
293 B.R. 12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Soares, 107 F.3d at 969 (finding
knowing violations can never be retroactively cured).
1
"
What if X deliberately violated the automatic stay by purchasing at A' s foreclosure
sale, and D later voluntarily dismissed the proceeding? These were the facts in Sports &
Science, Ind., Inc. v. Rielly (In re Sports & Science, Ind., Inc.), 95 B.R. 745 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
Should X receive the benefit of the dismissal when the case is dismissed? The Sports & Science
court still insisted on absolute voidness. Id. at 747. Yet if the first bankruptcy proceeding was
so illegitimate as to warrant dismissal, it seems to the author that the equities sometimes lie
with X-not with D. See In re Allen, 300 B.R. 105, 120 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2003) (stay annulled
where A and X had no knowledge of the bankruptcy and where D' s bankruptcy petition was
filed in bad faith); In re Webb, 294 B.R. 850 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003) (knowing violation in
light of a repetitive filer).
1
"
This option may still be viable in the Lusardi case. According to the Ninth Circuit,
"Lusardi asked the [bankruptcy] court to apply the [bad faith] dismissal retroactively so as to
give effect to the tax sale. The parties disagree as to whether the bankruptcy court denied the
motion or rather declined to address it. In either case, Lusardi does not now seek relief on
the theory that the stay should be retroactively avoided." 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi,
329 F.3d 1076, 1080 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
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notion because no cross-reference to § 542(c) appears in § 362(b)
145
to negate automatic stay voidness.
However, assuming that
'" The Sixth Circuit has arguably ruled that the automatic stay preempts the § 542(c)
defense . Smith v. First Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Smith), 876 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1989), a.ffgSmith
v. First Am. Bank-Mich., N.A. (In re Smith), 86 B.R. 92 (W.D. Mich. 1988). In this case, prior
to the bankruptcy petition, A , a secured creditor, repossessed a car. In re Smith, 86 B.R. at 9293. Without knowledge of the bankruptcy, A sold the car. Id. a t 93. The bankruptcy court
held that A had the § 542(a) defense. Id. The district court disagreed. Id. at 95-96. In a
rather confusing opinion, it thought it essential to distinguish another case, In re Smith Cwset
Sht>ps, Inc., 696 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1982). In Smith Corset, A was D's landlord. Id. at 973. In
ignorance of a bankruptcy petition, A had the constable evict D. Id. The constable put D's
inventory into storage. Id. D sued A for converting girdles to his own use. Id. A offered to
tender the girdles back to A but insisted that the conversion action be dismissed. Id. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that no act of conversion occurred. Id. at 977. In so
doing, it referred to§ 542(c): "[DJ argues that section 542(c) does not apply here because it
covers only cases in which property is 'transferred' to a third party . . . . But whether or not
section 542(c) is technically applicable, it is a powerful indication of congressional acceptance
of the principle set out in Bank of Marin." Id. at 976-77 (footnotes omitted) . The court went
on to point out that D could have notified A of the bankruptcy petition but did not until after
the inventory was in the warehouse. Id. at 977. Notice that the case was not, strictly speaking,
a§ 542(c) case, but it did find in§ 542(c) a policy of forgiving offenses to the automatic stay if
A is ignorant of the bankruptcy petition.
Back in the Sixth Circuit, the district court thought that the facts in Smith were less
egregious than in Smith Corset. Mysteriously, on the subject of§ 542 (c), the court remarked:
[A) also argues that the bankruptcy court's ruling is consistent with Smith Corset in
light of the specific language of 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) which protects the transfer of
property of the debtor by an entity that has neither actual notice nor actual
knowledge of the commencement of the Chapter 13 case. The Court, however,
does not believe that the facts of this case warrant the overriding of the "automatic"
provisions of the so-called automatic stay ....
. . . The Court finds that, in any event, section 542(c) clearly should not be read to
protect postpetition transferees of estate property since section 542(c) protects, at
most, only those parties holding property at the time of the petition.
86 B.R. at 95-96, 95 n.l. This remark is odd. In Smith, A did have the car in its possession at
the start of the case. In re Smith, 86 B.R. at 93. Furthermore, nothing in§ 542(c) states that its
principle is limited to cases in which repossession antedates the bankruptcy petition . All that
§ 542(c) requires is a conveyance by A in ignorance of the bankruptcy petition. Nevertheless,
the district court ruled that it (not the bankruptcy court) had discre tion to ignore § 542(c)
and enforce the automatic stay:
[T)he Court believes that to affirm the bankruptcy court's holding in this case
under these facts, would be to take a precarious first step down a slippery slope
leading towards the requiring of some sort of formal service of process and/ or
actual notice of the automatic stay. The Court is well aware of the equitable
exception set forth in Smith Cwset. However, to apply Smith Cwset under these facts
would result in suffocating the stay's intended policy of providing some "breathing
space" for the debtor and would allow an ad hoc equitable exception to swallow a
well-established legal rule.
Id. at 96. In other words, the district court viewed Smith Corset as an equitable case (which it
was) , and viewed § 542(c) as something it could ignore in the name of equity. Finally, and
extraordinarily, the district court compelled A to return the proceeds and permitted D to buy
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Lusardi's negation of Bankruptcy Code provisions in the name of
equity is illegitimate, it has not been recognized that if A validly
conveys, X validly receives the property free and clear of the
automatic stay. A cannot transfer property of the bankruptcy estate
unless there is a transferee. Only in California can one enfeoff
oneself. 146 Thus, § 542(c) expressly promises that A's transfer has
the same effect as if the transfer has been made prepetition.
According to § 542(c), if A has no notice or knowledge of the
bankruptcy petition, A "may transfer property of the estate, or pay a
debt owing to the debtor ... to an entity other than the trustee, with
the same effect as to the entity making such transfer or payment as if
the case under this title concerning the debtor had not been
147
commenced. "
The grammar of this sentence is somewhat
confusing. But it essentially says that A makes an effective transfer if
A is ignorant of the bankruptcy. Surely this section must be read in
conjunction with § 362(a) so that § 542(c) is an implicit exception
to the automatic stay. How can § 362(a) prohibit what § 542(c)
invites?
On the other hand, under § 549(a)-assuming no defense
applies-the trustee can avoid the transfer "(A) that is authorized
only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or (B) that is not
authorized under this title or by the court." Indeed, the very
reference to § 542(c) in § 549(a) (2) (A) proves that the conveyance
to Xis valid but for avoidance under § 549 (a) .
C.

Conveyances by Involuntary Bankrupts

Suppose, in lieu of greatness, D has bankruptcy thrust upon
him. Prior to the actual adjudication, D, under Bankruptcy Code
§ 303(f) , may "dispose of property as if an involuntary case
concerning the debtor had not been commenced." The trustee may
still be able to avoid the transfer under § 549(a) because
§ 549(a) (2) (A) permits avoidance of transfers "authorized only
a new car with them , granting A a new security interest for the forced loan . Id. at 98.
Th e Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed , In re Smith, 876 F.2d at 527, bu t said
no thing abou t § 542 (c). It too concen trated on distinguishing Smith Curse/. Id. at 525-26. So
has the Six th Circuit ruled that the automatic stay trumps§ 542 (c) ? Possibly so, tho ugh the
matter is confused .
146
Riddle v. Harmo n, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (1980) ("We discard the archaic rule th at
o ne cannot e nfeoff o nese lf .. . .").
'" 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (2000 ).
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under section 303(£) or 542(c) of this title." Section 549(b),
however, provides a defense, provided the transfer was not a
148
satisfaction or securing of an antecedent debt.
Significantly, courts rarely contend that acts pursuant to
149
§ 303(£) violate the automatic stay.
More commonly, courts rule
that "gap period transactions are avoidable only under
sections 549(a) (2) (A) and 549(b); the court cannot avoid this
150
restriction simply by ignoring the gap period. " It seems, then, that
§ 303(£) constitutes a defense from automatic stay voidness for both
15 1
Dand X.
Now, if this is true for§ 303(£), it is likewise true for§ 542(c).
When either § 303(£) or § 542(c) empowers a person to convey
property of the bankruptcy estate, there can be no question of
voidness under the automatic stay. The transferee validly receives
property, which the trustee must avoid, if she can, under § 549 (a).
One recent dissent with regard to § 303(£) is Fleet National Bank
152
v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp).
In Bankvest, D borrowed from
A to buy equipment for lease to customers. Upon leasing the
equipment, D would sell its reversionary interests and use the
proceeds to repay A. D was forced involuntarily into bankruptcy,
"' See Cossitt v. First Am. State Bank (In re Fort Dodge Creamery, Inc.), 121 B.R. 831, 836
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (holding voluntary payment of antecedent debt voidable under
§ 549(a)) . "Present transfer" has been loosely interpreted. For instance, where a debtor owes
rent at the beginning of the month and pays seven days into the month, the entire rent
payment is "present" consideration, and none of it satisfies an antecedent debt. Guinn v.
Oakwood Props., Inc. (In re Oakwood Mkts., Inc.), 203 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2000). Advance
payment has also been upheld. Yancey v. Varner (In re Pucci Shoes, Inc.), 120 F.3d 38 (4th
Cir . 1997) .
"' Official Comm. of Creditors v. Union Bank (In re Tex. Research, Inc.), 862 F.2d 1161
(5th Cir. 1989) (upholding gap security interest with no mention of automatic stay violation) .
150
Hamilton v. Lumsden (In re Geothermal Res. Int'!, Inc.), 93 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding executory contracts in the gap period can be upheld if reasonably equivalent
values exist) .
'" See Joseph Mullin, Note, Bridgi,ng the Gap: Defining the Debtm-'s Status During the
Involuntary Gap Period, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1109 (1994). One court may have gone too far
in ruling that the automatic stay never applies in the gap. In re Acelor, 169 B.R. 764, 765
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) ("It can not be presumed that the intent of Congress was to provide
that all acts of creditors are totally stayed upon the filing of an involuntary petition whilst the
debtor is free to wander the financial meadows without any controls or inhibitions as to its
acts or omissions.") . The argument here is only that where D exercises her § 303(£) power,
the automatic stay does not prevent a transferee from receiving the transfer. See Mann v.
Marine Bank W. (In re Omni Graphics, Inc.), 119 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990) (holding
where A repossessed before petition and held a foreclosure sale in the gap, A violated the
automatic stay) .
'" 375 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004), revg276 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) .
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and A nevertheless received some proceeds from D on its
153
antecedent debt during the gap period. Although the trustee
brought an action under § 549(a), the bankruptcy court insisted,
contrary to what I have said, that A also violated the automatic stay
154
by receiving what D voluntarily gave.
This holding was more or
155
less confirmed on appeal.
Underlying Bankvest is the premise that
all conveyances authorized under § 303(£) are void as violations of
156
the automatic stay.
Although Bankvest can be read as erasing§ 303(£) by means of
automatic stay voidness, the trustee won no victory after all.
Although A had no defense under § 549(b) because it received
funds on antecedent debt, it nevertheless had a valid security
interest on the funds it received. Once these proceeds were
recovered, the trustee had to honor A's secured claim, which was
157
resuscitated under § 502(h).
In effect, the trustee's theory was
158
worthless.
1

More precisely, a post-confirmation liquidating trustee.
In re Bankvest Captal Carp., 276 B.R. at 25-27.
155
A subsequent court, however, has ruled,
[t)he matter of the stay violation was not at issue in [the Bankvest] appeal. In a
footnote, the court stated that they were proceeding "in this opinion on the
assumption, also held by the bankruptcy and district courts, that a violation
occurred and that the ... avoidance of Fleet's receipt of those payments was in
order except for reasons otherwise discussed herein." In a later footnote, the court
again referred to the automatic stay and explained that "Fleet has provided no
coherent grounds for us to conclude that its retention of the gap payments was
permissible and therefore that avoidance would be improper. Accordingly, we shall
assume that the decisions below were correct insofar as they found that the
avoidance would otherwise be in order . .. ."
In re Gaudreault, 315 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (citations omitted). Given the
presuppositional nature of the First Circuit opinion, the Gaudreault court felt free to hold that
§ 303(f) overrules automatic stay voidness.
1
"'
Similarly, in In re E.D. Wilkins Grain Co., 235 B.R. 647 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999), A was a
secured creditor claiming accounts receivable. D and A stipulated that the automatic stay
should be lifted to allow D to draw down loans from A and remit proceeds to A. Id. at 649.
The court refused to approve this stipulation and instead insisted that A move to lift the stay
after serving papers on the United States attorney and the petitioning creditors. Id. Based on
what the author has suggested, however, the automatic stay did not apply at all, so long as D's
actions constituted "operating a business" within the meaning of§ 303(f) .
157
Bankvest, 375 F.3d at 66-70. According to § 502(h), "[a) claim arising from the
recovery of property under section ... 550 ... shall be determined, and shall be allowed .. .
or disallowed ... the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the
petition."
'"' Why then did the liquidation trustee bring the action? There was a weird turn in
Bankvest. After it received the proceeds and applied them to its secured claim, A sold the
remainder of its bankruptcy claim against D to X. Bankvest, 375 F.3d at 56. The sales
~j

1
"
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Statute of Limitations

Section 549(d) provides a statute of limitations: "An action or
proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the
earlier of-(1) two years after the date of the transfer sought to be
avoided; or (2) the time the case is closed .... " In the case where D
or A has a genuine power to convey property of the estate, the
statute of limitations is appropriately applied. For example, in the
involuntary "gap" where D conveys property, the conveyance is fully
authorized in spite of the automatic stay. It may still be avoided
under§ 549(a) , however. In such a case, the statute oflimitations is
159
properly considered.
But in cases where § 549(a) is wrongly
invoked (because the debtor has no power to convey away the
160
debtor's property), the statute of limitations should never apply.
It therefore becomes a matter of importance to focus on whether
the trustee needs an avoidance theory under§ 549(a) or not.
Meanwhile, if automatic stay voidness reigns supreme, § 549(d)
is one of the provisions read out of the Bankruptcy Code.
Automatic stay voidness implies that neither D nor A ever conveyed
anything to X in the first place. Once again, judge-made law wipes
out an express enactment of Congress.

agreement between A and X was very broad indeed, covering all claims by A against the
bankruptcy estate, "whether known or unknown ." Id. The trustee alleged that the meaning of
this agreement was that, when A surrendered the cash proceeds back to the trustee, X (not A)
had the secured claim against the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 63. Yet X had previously released
all claims against D. Id. Hence, the trustee reasoned that the trustee could retain the cash
proceeds free and clear of A's security interest. Id. The bankruptcy court agreed with the
trustee. Id.
On appeal, the district court apparently read the bankruptcy court as ordering a
forfeiture of the security interest as a penalty for violating the stay. It reversed, holding the
penalty of forfeiture did not fit the crime of stay violation. Id. at 65. In truth, the bankruptcy
court seemed to be ruling only that X, not A, owned the security interest in the proceeds. It
was not imposing any penalty on A but determining ownership of the secured claim under the
contract between A and X.
On further appeal, the First Circuit ruled that the agreement between A and X simply
did not cover proceeds A would have to surrender to the trustee. Id. at 66. Therefore, A had
a valid security interest in whatever it surrendered to the trustee. Id. The entire law suit
unraveled for the trustee at this point.
1
"
Consol. Partners Inv. Co. v. Lake (In re Consol. Partners Inv. Co.), 152 B.R. 485
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
160
See supra text accompanying notes 22-56.
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Grace Periods Under State Law

1.

Postpetition Perfections

Bankruptcy Code § 546(b) (1) provides an express defense to
§ 549 avoidance:
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 549
of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective
against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the
date of perfection ....

This provision equally empowers debtors to make conveyances in
derogation of the automatic stay. According to § 362(b) (3), the
automatic stay does not prohibit "any act to perfect ... an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are
subject to such perfection under section 546 (b) of this title .... " In
general, any act falling within § 546(b) is immune both from
§ 549 (a) avoidance and automatic stay voidness.
In Lusardi, the county refused to issue X a deed in light of the
automatic stay. Therefore, X had nothing to record, and D's
eventual recording of the bankruptcy notification doomed X's
attempt to invoke the§ 549(c) defense. But what if Xhad obtained
the deed and recorded it? Might not this act of perfection fall
within § 546(b) (l)? According to this provision: ''The rights and
powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 549 of this title are
subject to any generally applicable law that-(A) permits perfection
of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that
acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection .... "
X's perfection would appear to fit within § 546(b) (1) (A). The
trustee is "an entity that acquires rights in such property before the
date of perfection." That is, when D files for bankruptcy, the trustee
obtains ownership of D's equity. Section 549(c) is part of the
161
"generally applicable law," and it permits X to defeat an entity who
is prior in time. X's claim to fall within § 546(b) (1) would seem to
be a good one.
I

1

"
Notice that § 54l(c)(l) refers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law." "Generally
applicable law" within the meaning of§ 546(b) (1) must therefore include bankruptcy law as
well as state law.
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2

Value T Sales, Inc. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell/6 held otherwise. It
held that the sale from A (who knew of the bankruptcy) to X (who
did not) was itself void as violating the automatic stay. This meant X
163
had no interest that could be perfected.
Ironically, if A had been
ignorant of the bankruptcy, then § 542(c) would have applied,
presuming Lusardi-style reasoning had not wiped it out. If§ 542(c)
164
applied, A validly conveyed an interest to X,
and X validly
perfected it under§ 546(b) (1) free and clear of the automatic stay
and § 549(a) avoidance. This leaves X, a bona fide purchaser, in a
very strange position. If A knows of the bankruptcy, X loses under
Mitchell. If A does not know, X wins. Surely this is acephalous law
indeed, if any doubts on that score still remain.

2.

Postpetition Advances

An important issue for the current article concerns postpetition
advances A makes under a prepetition security agreement with D,
where D personally (as opposed to the bankruptcy trustee or debtorin-possession) obtains the advances. Sometimes A's advances create
a lien that is senior to the lien of the intervening party. For
example, under U .C.C. § 9-323(b), a lender may make senior
advances to a prior judicial lien for forty-five days after the lien
attaches or any time before the lender has knowledge of the judicial
165
lien.
This is established by the "negative pregnant" of § 9-323 (b),
which provides:
[A] security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person that
becomes a lien creditor to the extent that the security interest secures

1 2
•

279 B.R. 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).
"' Id. at 844 ( "As the foreclosure sale was itself void, later perfection could not validate
it."). Furthermore, the court even ruled in a subsequent case that it is an abuse of discretion
to annul the automatic stay retroactively just so X can vindicate the § 549(c) defense by
perfecting within the meaning of§ 546(b)(l) (A). Fjeldsted v. Lien (In re Fjeldsted), 293 B.R.
12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003). Other courts have ruled just the opposite-that access to the
§ 549(c) d efense is per se grounds to annul the stay. Jones v. Garcia (In re]ones), 63 F.3d 411,
412 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Little v. Bago (In re Bago), 149 B.R. 610, 614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993);
New Orleans Airport Motel Assocs., Ltd. v. Lee (In re Servico, Inc.), 144 B.R. 933 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1992).
1
6-1
Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1989).
165
E.g., UNI Imports, Inc. v. Aparacor, Inc., 978 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
advances during the forty-five d ay period were senior, advances with knowledge thereafter
were not).
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an advance made more than 45 days after the person becomes a lien
creditor unless the advance is made:
(1) without knowledge of the lien; or
(2) pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of
166
the lien.

Under state law, D has the power to create senior security interests
167
for its lenders forty-five days after a judicial lien attaches.
Real estate law likewise empowers D, on occasion, to create
senior security interests by accepting advances after the intervention
of a lien. For example, Missouri law states:
As to any third party who may acquire . . . a lien upon the
encumbered real property, the priority of. . . future advances ...
shall date from the time the security instrument is recorded, whether
or not any third party has actual notice of any such advances or
obligations and whether or not such advances or obligations are
168
optional or obligatory with the lender . . . .

Under this provision, A's post-encumbrance advances to D are
senior to prior encumbrances.
Section 546(b) (1) arguably invites A to take a lien senior to the
trustee's lien by making postpetition advances to D. Perfection, at
least under Article 9, means attachment plus some extra step of
169
"publicity. "
Assuming a prepetition financing statement is
properly filed, D's postpetition advance simultaneously creates and
perfects a senior security interest for A (if the advance is made
without knowledge or within forty-five days of the bankruptcy).
There is, however, a lively controversy over whether§ 546(b) (1)
countenances lien creation as well as lien perfection. Some courts
have assumed that postpetition perfection is permitted only if lien
170
creation occurred prepetition.
Yet nothing on the face of
§ 546(b) (1) requires such a conclusion.
All that § 546(b) (1)
requires is that (1) an act constitute "perfection" of an interest and

166

U.C.C. § 9-323(b) (2000).
"' David Gray Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (pt. I), 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 346-68 (1984).
168

100

Mo. REV. STAT.§ 443.055.5 (2000).

U.C.C. § 9-308(a).
170
Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n) , 880
F.2d 1540, 1546-47 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
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(2) seniority of that interest (under state law) to "an entity that
acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection." If
read literally, § 546(b) (1) seems to cover the future advance that
"perfects" a senior security interest. 171
In 229 Main Street Ltd. v. Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (In re 229 Main Street Ltd.), 172 a bankruptcy
trustee argued that, whereas § 362 (a) ( 4) prohibits any act to create
or perfect a lien, § 362(b) (3) exempts only acts to perfect. 173 The
supposed implication of this observation is that creation is a void
act, but perfecting a prepetition lien is permitted. Therefore, only
perfection apart from lien creation is permitted. The Main Street
court, however, rejected this argument. In Main Street, the state
environmental agency "created" and perfected a postpetition lien
and was nevertheless protected under § 546(b). 174 "Under the
debtor's theory," the court remarked, "an act that effected the
concurrent creation and perfection of a lien would, at one and the
same time, be both stayed (by section 362(a) ( 4)) and exempted
from the stay (by section 362(a) (3)). We decline to indulge in so
175
schizophrenic a reading of the Bankruptcy Code. "
Ultimately,
Main Street is ambiguous on the point of postpetition lien creation
because it purports to find the state had a prepetition "interest" in
the collateral. The prepetition interest was an unsecured claim
which might become a lien (but was not yet one). In other words,
the prepetition in personam claim was already an inchoate in rem
claim. Quite apart from this questionable suggestion, Main Street
nevertheless seems to suggest that the simultaneous postpetition
creation and perfection of a lien falls within the protection of
§ 546(b) (1).
Some courts require that state law demonstrate an overt notion
of "relation back" before § 546(b) (1) applies. This is typically
deduced from the legislative history that gives, as an example, the
filing of a U.C.C. financing statement within the grace period for
rn
Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Under various
sections of the U.C.C., a perfected security interest relates back to either the filing of a
financing statement or the date that the security interest attaches.").
112
262 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
'" Id. at 9.
"' Id.
"' Id.; see also Klein v. Civale & Trovato, Inc. (In re Lionel Corp.), 29 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding an act to enforce which was also act to perfect was protected under
§§ 362(b) (3) and 546(b)(l) ).
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176

purchase money security interests.
In such an example, A has an
unperfected security interest before bankruptcy and perfection after
177
bankruptcy. Thus, in In re AR Accessories Group, Inc., a state agency
obtained a postpetition superpriority lien for unpaid wages when it
filed a notice. The AR court did not require the state statute to have
178
an overt relation back feature on its face.
Nevertheless, it required
a prepetition unsecured claim for wages to which the superpriority
179
could "relate back. "
According to at least some courts, then, the issue with
discretionary advances is whether the new lien relates back to some
prepetition event. This question implicates us in a famous tussle
180
over the status of new advances between Peter Coogan and Grant
181
Gilmore,
at the dawn of Article 9 jurisprudence. Gilmore
182
proffered a "unitary" theory of the security interest.
Suppose D
grants A a prepetition security interest in a thing. D then files for
bankruptcy.
A then makes a discretionary advance to D in
derogation of the bankruptcy estate. Gilmore would have said that
the security interest in question "relates back." That is, the security
interest is purely prepetition even though a quantitative component
of the lien is postpetition. This view privileges the qualitative
moment of the lien-the power of sale-over the quantitative
moment. The power of sale in A is fully set before the bankruptcy
petition. The future advance does not alter the power of sale, only
the quantity of cash A can retain once the power of sale is exercised.
Such a view of the discretionary advance entails a clear "relation
back" element. In contrast, Coogan emphasized a multiple theory
183
of security interests.
In the Coogan view, A has two security
interests: one perfected prepetition and one perfected
• •
184
postpet1t1on.
176
Makoroff, 916 F.2d at 892, 892 n .l (3d Cir. 1990) (citing H .R. REP. No. 95-595, at 37172 (1977)). The grace period is currently found in U.C.C. § 9-317 (2000).
177
345 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2003).
178
Id. at 458 ("[W]e hold that a priming statute need not contain language expressly
providing for retroactive pe rfection in order to trigger the exception provided in 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(b)(l)(A) .... ").
179
Id.
180

Peter F. Coogan, Artie/£ 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priarities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien, " 72 HARV. L. REV. 838, 868 (1959).
18 1
2 GRANT GILMORE, SECU RITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 35.6, at 935 ( 1965) .
1
"
Seeid.
185
Coogan, supra note 180, at 873-80.
1
"
Seeid.
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Coogan won the day, and his view lives registered in the 1972
amendments to the U.C.C., which indicate that, at least some of the
185
time, the discretionary advance creates a junior security interest.
186
Some of the time, however, it creates a senior security interest.
Under the multiple theory, is there a "relation back"? It is possible
to see the new advance as part of the prepetition lien, in which case
a "relation back" is achieved. It is also possible to view the new
advance as creating an entirely separate lien, which does not "relate
back." Meanwhile, it is not even clear that § 546(b) (1) requires a
187
"relation back" theory in order to function.
In the end, however, § 546(b) may not apply in discretionary
advance cases, but for a rather indirect reason.
Bankruptcy
effectively destroys loan facilities calling for advances, so that any
postpetition advance is simply not within the purview of the
agreement anymore. Rather, the future advance is simply an
unsecured advance. This is so because the power of D to draw funds
from A is part of an executory contract governed by Bankruptcy
Code § 365.
Such a loan facility, however, is a financial
188
accommodation contract within the meaning of § 365 (c) (2) .
At
least one court has held that it is impossible for a bankruptcy trustee
189
ever to assume such a contract, even if the creditor consents.
Section 365(c) (2) suggests that the trustee can never compel A to
make advances to the bankruptcy trustee by assuming the security
agreement between A and D. But how does § 365(c) (2) affect
advances to D (not to the trustee)?
The proper answer is that the executory contract is itself
property of the bankruptcy estate. In effect, when D files for

'" u.c.c. § 9-301(4)

(1978).
,,. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Future Nonadvance Obligations
Under Article 9 of the UCC: Legitimat,e Priority or Unwarranted Squeeze-Out?, 102 BANKING LJ. 412
(1985) (reviewing this debate).
187
A similar issue exists for fraudulent transfer law.
Where D has guaranteed
discretionary advances to S, each new advance is deemed to be a new fraudulent transfer for
statute of limitations purposes. Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 990 (2d Cir.
1981); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact ofFraudulent Conveyance Law on Future Advances Supported
uy Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 729 ( 1987).
188
Section 365(c)(2) provides: "The trustee may not assume or assign any executory
co ntract or unexpired lease of the debtor . .. if .. . (2) such contract is a contract to make a
loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor .... "
"' Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine,
Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991) .
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bankruptcy, D conveys all executory contracts to the bankruptcy
estate. In the case of the security agreement permitting senior
secured advances, D surrenders the right to draw on A to the
bankruptcy trustee.
This right against A is an asset of the
190
bankruptcy estate.
The trustee, however, is compelled by
§ 365(c) (2) to reject this right to draw. Upon rejection, which
happens instantaneously and inexorably, the right to draw-a right
against A-is in effect tendered back to A. In different words, the
bankruptcy trustee releases A from A's obligation to advance funds.
This right to draw does not revert back to D. Therefore, if A does
advance funds to D, the advance is not under the security
agreement. Because the advance is not covered by the security
agreement, it cannot encumber estate property. This, I maintain,
best explains why postpetition advances are not privileged under
191
§ 546(b) (1) to create senior liens on the bankruptcy estate.
This
point will become significant for my analysis of the important case

190

See David Gray Carlson & William H . Widen, Letters of Credit, Voidab/,e Preferences, and the
"Independence" Princip!,e, 54 Bus. LAW. 1661, 1675-76 (1999) .
1
"

Not all postpetition value extended by A will be in the form of advances, in which case
§ 546(b) might apply after all. In Snyder v. Dewoskin (In re Mahendra), 131 F.3d 750 (8th Cir.
1997), A was an attorney who gave bankruptcy advice to D. A held a mortgage on D's house
for postpetition services rendered. Id. at 753. The court implied that if A's postpetition
"advances" were senior to third parties under Missouri law, it would be senior to the
bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 755. Nevertheless, the court decided against A. Id. at 756. It cited
Missouri Revised Statutes § 443.055.6, which permits an adversely affected party to serve
notice on A by registered mail that it considered A's future advance power to be canceled. Id.
at 755. If such notice was sent, then A had to file notice of its outstanding secured claim and
could make no further claims beyond the amount recorded.
The Mahendra court ruled, very dubiously, that A's knowledge of the bankruptcy petition
was the equivalent of the trustee serving a registered letter on A. Id. at 759-60. In other
words, bankruptcy trustees have a per se defense against A as a matter of Missouri law. See id.
This solution-which probably must be accounted as a gross butchery of Missouri law-invites
Missouri to legislate a different result in derogation of a bankruptcy trustee's rights.
Whatever one thinks of the Mahendra court's interpretation of Missouri law, there is
much else shocking in the Mahendra opinion which is beyond the scope of this article. For
example, D was allowed to assert exemption rights against A's mortgage for postpetition
interest. Id. at 750. This could not be more wrong. Indeed, such a holding suggests that D's
exemption is just as good against any prepetition mortgage for postpetition interest, or even
against prepetition mortgage claims. Furthermore, the court ruled that A could not claim a
mortgage on D's property and represent Din a chapter 7 case because D violated the conflict
of interest rules in Bankruptcy Code§ 327(a). Id. at 757. Yet§ 327(a) applied to counsel for
the bankruptcy trustee, never D's private counsel. Furthermore, A was sanctioned under Rule
11 for his so-<:alled conflict of interest and for making a frivolous appeal. Id. at 759-60.
Clearly the Mahendra opinion must be viewed as acephalous. In most of the above respects it
should be ignored as uncommonly bad law.
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192

of Beel,er v. Jewell (In re Stanton),
which involved postpetition
193
advances under D's prepetition security agreement.
F.

Postpetition Ad Valorem Taxes

Another implied defense against § 549(a) avoidance is the
postpetition creation of ad valorem property tax liens. Prior to
1994, a lively controversy brewed over the status of property tax liens
which arose postpetition as a matter of state law. Some courts
thought that, qualitatively, these liens were latent prepetition liens
whose quantitative nature might expand postpetition without
194
violating the automatic stay.
Other courts proclaimed the liens
195
196
• 1atmg
.
. stay. I t was equa11y
v01'd or v01'da ble as vio
th e automat.J.c
197
true that these liens were avoidable under§ 549(a).
In 1994, Congress attempted to aid local taxing authorities by
enacting § 362 (b) ( 18), which permits "the creation or perfection of
a statutory lien for [] ad valorem property tax[es] ... if such tax
comes due after the filing of the petition." This prevents voidness
on an automatic stay theory but does nothing to prevent § 549(a)
avoidance.
I am tempted to suggest that § 362(b) (18) is an implied
defense to§ 549(a) avoidance; Congress could not have intended to
permit the attachment of liens, insofar as the automatic stay was
concerned, while reserving for the trustee the right to avoid them
under § 549(a). In any case, the trustee has a better theory than
§ 549 (a).
The very liens preserved by Congress in 1994 are
subordinate under the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 724(b) to
administrative and other high-priority claims.
According to
§ 724(b):

1
"

303 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), affg 248 B.R. 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). An earlier
withdrawn opinion exists at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002).
1
"
See infra text accompanying notes 271-73.
1
~'
Md. Nat'! Bank v. Mayor of Baltimore (In re Md. Glass Co.}, 723 F.2d 1138, 1142-43
(4th Cir. 1983).
195
Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n), 880
F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
196
City of Farmers Branch v. Pointer (In re Pointer), 952 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting
lien was voidable but senior secured creditor had no standing to avoid) .
9
' '
Id. at 88 n.8.
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Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a
lien that is not avoidable under this title and that secures an allowed
claim for a tax, or proceeds of such property, shall be distributed(2) second, to any holder of a claim of a kind specified in
section 507(a) (1) ... [through] ... Section 507(a) (7) of this title,
to the extent of the amount of such allowed tax claim that is
secured by such tax lien;
(3) third, to the holder of such tax lien, to any extent that
such holder's allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien
exceeds any amount distributed under paragraph (2) of this
subsection;
(4) fourth, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a
lien on such property that is not avoidable under this title and that
is junior to such tax lien;
(5) fifth, to the holder of such tax lien, to the extent that
such holder's allowed claim secured by such tax lien is not paid
under paragraph (3) of this subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the estate.

Even if a property tax lien creditor is saved by § 362(b) (18) from
automatic stay voidness (and presumably from§ 549(a) avoidance),
the tax lien may well fail because of the distribution scheme
198
described under§ 724(b).
For example, where D grants A a valid
mortgage which is now underwater and where the county claims a
superpriority tax lien senior to the lien of A, the county obtains no
distribution under § 724(b) (3) if the trustee's administrative
199
expenses under§ 507(a) exceed the amount of the property tax.
In spite of the 1984 amendments, then, it is unclear whether the
postpetition county tax creditor obtains any benefit from its
200
postpetition lien.
"' Bd. of Supervisors v. King (In re Van Metre, Jr., Inc.), No. 93-1706, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 935 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 1994); Marc Stuart Goldberg, P.C. v. City of N.Y. (In re Navis
Realty), 193 B.R. 998 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Oglesby, 196 B.R. 938 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996).
199
Morgan v. K.C . Mach. & Tool Co. (In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co.), 816 F.2d 238 (6th
Cir. 1987). Or even if the administrative expenses are less than the property tax, the other
priorities described in § 507(a) (l)-(7) must be considered as well. Because A's claim
encompasses the entire value of the real estate after the county's tax lien, the county also
obtains no distribution under§ 724(b) (5).
200
Weirdly, perhaps the county can claim to be an administrative creditor under
§ 507(a) (l), and therefore entitled to join in a § 724(b) (2) distribution. Administrative
claims are defined by § 503(b). Section 503(b)(l)(B) excludes any tax described by
§ 507(a)(8), but a property tax assessed postpetition is not described by § 507(a) (8).
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The Defenses in§ 550

As a final matter, defenses are presented in § 550(a). For
example, § 550(e) gives to X a lien for the amount of any

improvement made to property of the estate wrongly retained. The
question is whether the defense is available against avoidance
actions under§ 549(a).
This question-a most troublesome one-pertains not only to
§ 549(a) avoidance, but to fraudulent transfers, voidable
preferences, and the like. As the purpose and meaning of the
201
§ 550(a) defenses have been covered more generally elsewhere,
these matters will only be summarized here.
According to§ 550(a):
[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under section ... 549 . ..
the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property
transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property,
from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for
whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.

The grammar of§ 550(a) is significant. "Recovery"-whatever that
is-presupposes "avoidance." Avoidance is what§ 549(a) refers to.

Therefore, the county might be able to sneak up from § 724(b) (3) into § 724(b) (2) in its
guise as an admi nistrative creditor. In re Navis &ally, 193 B.R. at 1005.
Alas, the following dilemma further complicates the analysis. If A is under water for its
secured claim, every dollar of property tax that accrues is a depreciation of A's secured claim.
If the trustee does not pay the property tax currently, then A can claim an offense of its right
to adequate protection. The remedy for failed adequate protection is a superpriority under
§ 507(b) . This priority outranks § 507(a) (1). Putting all this together, every dollar of
property tax that accrues generates a senior superpriority in A which squeezes out the
county' s (and everyone else's) administrative claim . The county is effectively prevented by
this from creeping out of§ 724(b) (3) into§ 724(b) (2). See In re LMS Holding Co. , 197 B.R.
915 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) (stating § 507(b) creditor took tax lien amount under
§ 724(b) (2) ).
Properly, § 724(b) applies indirectly in chapter 11 cases through the rule in
§ 1129(a)(7)(A). Section 1129(a)(7)(A) implies that a chapter 11 plan need only give
secured creditors what they would have received under chapter 7. It is submitted that
§ 1129(a) (7) (A) makes§ 724(b) pertinent in chapter 11 cases.
'°' See generally David Gray Carlson, Avoidance Theury According to St.eve Nickles, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1277 (2001); Carlson, supra note l ; Steve H . Nickles, Deprizio Dead Yet? Birth,
Wounding and Another Attempt to Kill the Case, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2001) .

156

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

Given avoidance, recovery is merely an option for the trustee-one
among many.
What, then, is recovery, and how is it different from avoidance?
In my view, "recovery" refers to the in personam liability of a
nontransferee-what § 550(a) calls "the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made." The necessity of referring to the "entity
benefited" was inspired by§ 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which
indicated that voidable preferences include transfers for the benefit
202
of creditors (not just transfers to creditors) .
Section 60 of the
203
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included a "recovery" section.
From that
one learned that voidable preferences could be recovered from
204
transferees.
How, then, could a trustee recover from the person
benefited who was never a transferee?
To solve this riddle, courts invented the so-called "two transfer"
theory. The transfer to a creditor was one transfer. The "benefit"
felt by a non-transferee was yet another. This two transfer theory
was memorably demolished by Judge Frank Easterbrook in Levit v.
205
Ingersoll Rand Finandal Corp.
In 1977, through the inclusion of§ 550(a) in the Bankruptcy
Code, the drafters were able to legislate away the need for the
"fiction" that made non-transferees into transferees. The point of
§ 550(a) was to make clear that the "person benefited" is a proper
party, not just in voidable preference cases but in cases involving
206
many other avoidance powers as well.

"'' Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act ofl 978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401 (a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682).
"''

Seeid.

204

According to§ 60(b):
Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to
be benefited thereby ... has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the
trustee may recover the property or, if it has been converted, its value from any
person who has received or converted such property ....

Id. (emphasis added).

"'' 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The case is universally known as the Deprizio case after
the name of the debtor-in-possession.
200
This unique purpose was effectuated recently in In re Dyba/ski, 316 B.R. 312 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 2004), where the debtor wrote prepetition checks that were honored postpetition.
The bank that honored the checks was protected by§ 542(c), but the merchants paid by the
checks were not. Id. at 315, 316. Instead of pursuing the merchants, the trustee was
permitted to sue the "persons benefited"-the debtors themselves. Id. at 316-17. Incidentally,
the merchants did not violate the automatic stay in Dyba/ski. Id. at 316. Bankruptcy Code §
362(b)(ll) exempts from the automatic stay "the presentment of a negotiable
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Nevertheless, § 550(a) confusingly sets forth defenses that only
transferees can use. For example, a transferee of a transferee (but
not the initial transferee) has a "good faith transfer for value
defense" under§ 550(a). Under§ 550(e), a good faith transferee
who has invested in improvements is entitled to a lien for the lesser
of cost or value added. Finally, § 550(f) gives a statute of limitations
defense to "recovery" actions, which, significantly, differs from the
statute of limitations in § 549 (d). This might be cited by in rem and
in personam defendants alike. The fact that§ 549(a) avoidance and
550(a) recoveries have different statutes of limitations, however,
proves there is a substantive difference between avoidance and
recovery. The problem with the § 550 defenses is that avoidance
also occurs by means of § 551, the lien preservation provision.
According to § 551, "[a]ny transfer avoided under section .. .
549 . . . is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with
respect to property of the estate." The § 550(a) defenses do not
seem to apply here.
A comparison might be made between two very recent
interpretations of § 551 and § 550(a), pointing in very different
201
directions. In Suhar v. Burns (In re Burns), a debtor granted a
208
mortgage to a lender who did not perfect.
The lender then sold
209
the mortgage in the secondary market.
The mortgage was
voidable under § 544(a) (3) .210 The assignee tried to assert a valid
21 1
"improvement lien" under § 550(e).
The assignor had advanced
funds to retire an earlier recorded mortgage. 212 Therefore, the
assignee reasoned, the original lender had an "improvement" lien
213
under Bankruptcy Code § 550(e).
The Burns court, however,
instrument ... ." Although the stay was not violated , the merchants were nevertheless liable
under § 549(a) for receivable postpetition property of the estate. Id.; see Thomas v. Money
Mart Fin. Servs., 311 B.R. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) .
"'' 322 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2003).
208
Id. at 423.
200

Id.

2 10

Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 424.
Id.

2 11
212

21
'

According to § 550 (e) ( 1):
A good faith trustee from whom the trustee may recover under subsection (a) of
this section has a lien on the property recovered to secure the lesser of(A) the cost, to such transferee , of any improvement made after the
transfer, less the amount of any profit realized by or accruing to such
transferee from such property; and
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overruled the defense because the strong arm power avoided the
conveyance without any reference to§ 550(a). The court expressly
noted that § 551 independently brought the avoided lien into the
bankruptcy estate, thus § 550(e) cannot be characterized as a
214
defense to§ 551.
When, if ever, must a trustee use § 550(a), thereby triggering
the§ 550(e) defense? Borrowing a distinction drawn from Epstein's
215
Bankruptcy treatise, the Burns court declared that, when a creditor
is in physical possession of the collateral to which a voidable lien has
attached, the trustee must proceed under § 550(a) in order to
216
"recover" the collateral.
But this does not follow. According to
the court's own logic, the trustee owned the avoided lien under
§ 551. This lien implies the trustee's right to use, sell, or lease
under § 363. Why cannot the trustee simply bring a turnover action
under § 542(a) or (b) to vindicate this right of possession? In any
case, why should a secured party who has not yet repossessed have
no defenses under§ 550(e), whereas an entity that has possession
obtain it? This makes no sense, especially where bankruptcy policy
is meant to prevent creditors from repossessing property the trustee
2 11
might use, sell, or lease.
In comparison, consider the facts of Wasserman v. Bressman (In
2 18
re Bressman).
In Bressman, D allegedly sent estate funds to a Cook
219
Islands trust.
Needing criminal counsel, D arranged for the Cook
220
Islands trust to wire funds to his spouse's bank account.
The
221
spouse's bank honored the spouse's check to D's criminal counsel.
The key to the analysis (though nowhere acknowledged) was that
the bank transfers were presumably made under the shelter of
§ 542(c). If the banks were (as \Vas likely) unaware that they were
transferring estate funds , then § 542(c) applied to validate the
transfers provisionally. The trustee therefore had to bring a

2 14
2 15

216

(B) any increase in the value of such property as a result of such
improvement of the property transferred.
Id. at 428.
2 DAVID G. EPTSEIN ET AL., B ANKRUPTCY§ 6-79 (1992).

In re Bums, 322 F.3d at 428.
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (noting lawful repossession
can be undone through turnover proceeding) .
'" 327 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2003) .
2 19
Id. at 235. Or so the court assumed, for the purpose of analysis.
220
Id. at 234.
"' Id.
2 11
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§ 549(a) action against criminal counsel to recover the estate
222
funds.
If, however, the banks knew they were transferring estate
funds, then§ 542(c) would not shield the transactions. The trustee
could have brought a mere turnover action under§ 542(b) against
the banks, to which the defenses in § 549(a) and § 550 certainly
would not apply.
Assuming that turnovers under § 542(a) or (b) were off the
table because a bank made a conveyance covered by§ 542(c), the
trustee had to "avoid" the transfer under § 549(a). No defense
existed for criminal counsel under § 549. Therefore, the transfer
was "avoided" under § 549(a) and "preserved" under § 551. 223 As
such, the funds were part of the bankruptcy estate under
§54l(a)(4) .
Given that the transfer was now "avoided," "preserved," and
224
made part of the bankruptcy estate, it ought to have been possible
for the trustee to demand a turnover of the funds under§ 542(a) or
(b). As to a turnover under § 542 (b), the § 550 defenses would not
apply. Nevertheless, the Bressman court ruled that the trustee could
22 5
recover only via§ 550(a) . On this premise, criminal counsel could
and did assert a bona fide transferee defense under § 550 (b)
because counsel was the transferee of a transferee of potentially
voidable funds. 226
The Bressman result can be defended as within the suggestion
urged by the Burns court. Because criminal counsel was "in
possession" of funds, the trustee had to "recover" under § 550,
avoidance would not suffice. Under Burns, avoidance without
recovery works only when the trustee is already in possession-not
227
when some other entity has possession. Yet§ 551 works quite well
to circumvent § 550(a) altogether, even where counsel's claim to
the cash was possessory and absolute.
Whether§ 550 defenses are available in § 549(a) cases depends
on whether the trustee or some other entity is in possession, if Burns
is followed. Yet another level of complexity is added by the
automatic stay.
In Bressman, criminal counsel presumably

m

"'
"'
""
226
227

Id. at 235.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
In re Bums, 322 F. 3d 421 , 428 (6th Cir. 2003).
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committed acts "to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate."228 For example, criminal counsel endorsed the spouse's
229
check and sent it to their bank for deposit. Were these not ''void"
acts, suggesting that the trustee could recover the amounts voidably
deposited? Obviously, the Bressman result works only if defenses to
§ 549(a) avoidance are considered implicit exceptions to automatic
stay voidness.
IV. POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Ninth Circuit law on postpetition transfers is particularly
acephalous. The exceptionally interesting case of Beel.er v. Jewell (In
re Stanton/3° sheds some light on § 549(a) avoidance, as well as on
the nature of the bankruptcy estate itself. Before we can examine
this case, we must come to grips with the lamentable vocabulary that
has grown up in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has proved a
leader in postpetition jurisprudence, perhaps because its
terminology is so mystifying.
A.

The Vocabulary of Postpetition Transfers

By now, it should be apparent that the Ninth Circuit's
mediation in Lusardi of the collision between § 549(a) and the
automatic stay has been unsatisfactory. But, casting the automatic
stay aside, its interpretation of§ 549(a) is also deeply problematic.
The oft-cited case of Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Shamblin (In re
1
Shamblin/3 must be especially singled out for infusing doubtful
metaphysics into an environment already rife with contradiction. A
thorough understanding of Shamblin is required if we are to
understand what follows.
252
Shamblin involved an Illinois property tax lien -a creature so
unusual that it is not surprising the Ninth Circuit was baffled by it.

228
0
"

11 U.S.C.§362(a)(3) .
In re Bressman, 327 F.3d at 233.

''° 303 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), affg 248 B.R. 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) . An earlier
withdrawn opinion exists at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) .
"' 890 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1989) .
'" See Flaccus, supra note 109, at 86 ("For some reason there are more tax avoidance
court decisions under Illinois law than any other state.").
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233

Under Illinois law, when a county assesses a tax and obtains a
"lien," the county enforces it by selling a "certificate of purchase"
which eventually entitles the buyer to a fee simple estate, free and
clear of all encumbrances if the amount bid is not redeemed by the
debtor or some junior encumbrance. Oddly, the bidders compete
by offering the lowest redemption price. If no one redeems, the
buyer of the certificate of purchase has the right to a tax deed,
issued by a court clerk. Once issued, the buyer must record the tax
deed within one year. Upon recordation, the buyer owns a fee
simple estate.
In Shamblin, the county had a prepetition tax lien. Before it
could foreclose, D filed a bankruptcy petition. 234 Without knowledge
of the bankruptcy petition, the county sold a certificate of purchase
235
to X.
Under Illinois law, D had two years to redeem. 236 D never
237
did, and X eventually obtained a deed.
In that the county was ignorant of the bankruptcy proceeding,
the county was authorized by§ 542(c) to make the conveyance, and
X was authorized to receive it. Properly, there should have been no
mention of the automatic stay in this case. 238 Rather, it should have
been a§ 549(a) case pure and simple.
The bankruptcy court denied the trustee's motion to set aside
the sale on the grounds that X had a statute of limitations defense
under § 549(d) because more than two years had passed between
239
the sale and the trustee's adversary proceeding.
Although the
bankruptcy court thought that the automatic stay was violated, it
thought§ 549(d) was relevant to automatic stay theory. 240 Of course,
the automatic stay can be retroactively annulled. Perhaps the secret
meaning of the bankruptcy court's ruling was that the bankruptcy

"' The following description of Illinois property tax liens is drawn from McKeever v.
M cClandon (In reMcKeever), 132 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) .

"' D's bankruptcy was a chapter 11 proceeding, so D was also the bankruptcy trustee.
Nevertheless, I will refer to "the trustee" as a person separate and apart from D for purposes of
dramatic expositio n .
:m
In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d at 124.
2
'° Id.
2 1
'
Id. at 125.
2
See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
'" In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d at 125.
j8

240

Id.
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court was really annulling the stay and validating the tax sale in
241
order to vindicate the statute of limitations.
242
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. It thought that the
sale was void for violating the automatic stay and that§ 549(d) could
not serve as a defense to a principle arising from § 362(a). 243
Nevertheless, the appellate panel awarded a lien to X under the last
sentence of§ 549(c), which provides:
A good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commencement of
the case and for less than present fair equivalent value has a lien on
the property transferred to the extent of any present value given,
244
unless a copy or notice of the petition was so filed before such
transfer was so perfected.

In this the appellate panel fell into contradiction. How could
§ 549(c) be a defense to an automatic stay theory when § 549(d)
( the statute of limitations) was not?
The Ninth Circuit reversed again and was no less contradictory
than the lower courts. Ostensibly, it declined to rule that the
automatic stay overwhelms § 549 defenses, leaving that possibility
open. 245 Rather, it held:
Section 549 does not apply. The tax sale as conducted under Illinois
law was not a "transfer of property of the estate" under § 549.
Because an Illinois tax sale gives the purchaser only a lien on the
property the purchaser does not obtain a transfer of property of the
estate, but obtains only a claim against it. Because the tax sale was
not a "transfer of property of the estate" under subsection (a), none
of the provisions of § 549 apply. The exceptions to § 549, including

"' This possibility was rejected by the Ninth Circuit because the bankruptcy court
mentioned only§ 549(d) and said nothing of retroactive annulment. The court also ruled
that, if this was the bankruptcy court's intent, it would have been an abuse of discretion. Id. at
126.
2 2
-1
Id. at 125.
2,1, Id.
That is, filed in the local real estate records.
"' Id. at 127 n.5. The Ninth Circuit has since ruled definitively that the automatic stay
always erases § 549(c) defenses. 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 329 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2003).
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the provision granting a lien to certain good faith purchasers, cannot,
246
therefore, apply.

This is the statement that has spawned confusion in the Ninth
Circuit. Can it be true that, if X has a "lien," X has no property
interest?247 Surely a lien is an in rem interest, and lien creation the
248
archetypical transfer of property. For example, suppose a creditor
obtains a judicial lien the day before a bankruptcy petition. This is
the most brazen voidable preference imaginable. But voidable
preference requires a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property. "249 Yet, under Shamblin, there is no voidable preference
250
because lien creation is not a transfer of debtor property.
Furthermore, under Illinois law, surely the county sells
something to X at a foreclosure sale. In particular, X buys a
certificate of purchase that will ripen into a fee simple interest if Xis
not paid off. This is an interest that exceeds what the county had
251
prior to the sale. To call this thing a lien, however, as the Shamblin
court did, is confusing. It seems more in the nature of a conditional
future interest that becomes possessory upon D's failure to redeem.
"' In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d at 127 (footnotes and citations omitted).
'" One court has indeed suggested "[t]he Certificate of Purchase ... does not operate to
transfer any title, legal or equitable, Lo the tax purchaser." In re McKeever, 132 B.R. 996, 1006
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) .
'" In re Pointer, 952 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Attachment of a lien on property of the
estate is clearly a 'transfer' of property.").
\MY
11 U.S.C.§547(b).
250

In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d al 127.
" ' Courts routinely hold that the automatic stay does not stop redemption periods from
lapsing-though§ 108(b) has that effect for sixty days. E.g., Heikkila v. Carver (In re Carver),
828 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1987) . The facts in Shamblin, however, are different. In Shamblin, X
sought to start the redemption period running. 890 F.2d at 124-25. The commencement of
the period (by obtaining a certificate of purchase) does potentially violate the automatic
stay-though, in Shamblin, X could plausibly claim immunity from the automatic stay under
§ 542(c).
For a case holding that the automatic stay does not stop Illinois tax redemption periods
from running, provided the certificate of purchase was obtained prepetition, see Smith v.
Phoenix Bond & Indem., 288 B.R. 793 (N.D. Ill. 2002) . Interestingly, in Smith, Xwas careful to
move for relief from the automatic stay in order to obtain the tax deed. Id. at 795.
Confusingly, in In re Natchez. Cqrp., 953 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1992) , the court implied that
obtaining a tax deed after the redemption period was a new transfer under§ 549(a). As such,
the issuance of the tax deed could be avoided unless X has a defense. Yet, since X typically
does not pay the value of the fee simple interest and because X may know of the bankruptcy
proceeding at the time the redemption period lapses, it would appear that Xhas no defenses.
Perhaps the automatic stay does indirectly extend the redemption period under the Natchez.
case.
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A lien, in contrast, is a "charge against or interest in property to
252
secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation. "
The true meaning of the above passage, however, is supplied by
one of the footnotes. The Illinois tax foreclosure sale conveyed
nothing because of the automatic stay. 253 Since the automatic stay
voided the sale, X received nothing. In short, it appears that
automatic stay theory decided the case, and § 549 was simply
254
irrelevant. This footnote,
however, is at odds with the Ninth
Circuit's declaration that it was not ruling that automatic stay theory
255
preempts§ 549 defenses.
256
Shamblin is a difficult opinion,
and, predictably, it has
251
generated confusion. In Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz),
the Ninth Circuit suggested that § 549(c) is indeed a defense to
automatic stay theories. This is not an unfair reading of Shamblin.
But its exact language has further confused matters. In describing
Shamblin, the Schwartz court noted, "[w]e held that the tax sale was
not a transfer of property of the estate under section 549, reasoning
that the sale created only a lien on the property and did not actually
258
transfer the property itself for purposes of section 549."
Once
"' 11 u.s.c. § 101(37) .
"' The Shamblin court noted:
This court has consistently treated the creation of liens on the debtor's property as
a transfer. See, e.g., In re Wind Power Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 288, 291-92 (9th Cir.
1988); Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1966). These cases, however,
define "transfer" in the context of pre-petition, as opposed to post-petition,
transactions. The Shamblins and their creditors were fully protected against the
post-petition creation of a lien under § 362(a)(4). "Transfer" under § 549,
therefore, need not include the lien created by the Illinois tax sale.
890 F.2d at 127 n.7. For a similar case that reaches this result without contradictory
metaphysics, see Venn v. Bazzel (In re Lanbert), 273 B.R. 663 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2002).
'" In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d at 127 n.7.
"' Id. at 127.
256
At least one court has announced unhappiness with the above formulation from
Shamblin:
The court is not altogether comfortable with this interpretation. While it reaches
the correct result, it does so by use of a distinction which may run contrary to the
broad definition of property of the estate, and may not be consistent as a matte r of
law from state to state. More importantly, this solution fails to address the
fundamental question, raised by appellants, of the interrelationship between
§ 362(a) and other Bankruptcy Code sections which cannot always be resolved by
concluding that a post-petition transfer was not of property of the estate.
Garcia v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. (In re Garcia), 109 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
"' 954 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1991).
"' Id. at 574.
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again, the Ninth Circuit repeated the proposition that lien creation
259
is not a transfer of debtor property.
What the Schwartz court
should have said about Shamblin is that, because of the automatic
stay, the county's foreclosure sale could not convey property of the
bankruptcy estate, but it could convey the county's own lien (i.e.,
subrogation), which X could then assert in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Nothing in the automatic stay prevents A from
260
assigning her claim to X after D has filed for bankruptcy.
The Ninth Circuit itself had earlier recognized that lien
creation is a postpetition transfer. In Official Committee of Creditors v.
261
Union Bank (In re Texas Research, Inc.), D, an involuntary debtor,
262
granted a security interest to X in exchange for a loan.
Under
Shamblin and Schwartz this lien should have been considered ''void,"
but the Ninth Circuit ruled the lien was defended under § 549 (b).
Such a holding directly contradicts Shamblin as reinterpreted by
Schwartz. Under Texas Research, at least, postpetition lien creation is
a valid transfer of property of the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee
must step forward and avoid it, if she can.
The meaning of Shamblin grows yet more confusing after
263
Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), where a debtor filed for
chapter 11 protection and then, without court permission, granted a
264
mortgage to a lender who was unaware of the bankruptcy.
According to the McConville court, "[t]he Trustee argued that he
might avoid [the lien] under § 549(a) .. . [W]e find them both
blocked by our precedents ... which simply hold that the creation
265
of a lien does not transfer property for purposes of § 549. "
The
court went on to find the mortgage valid to the extent that funds
had actually been advanced, but invalid as to interest or attorneys'
fees, because this was unauthorized extension of credit to the
debtor. 266 In short, nunc pro tune approval, or after-the-fact
ratification under § 364, was granted to preserve part of the
postpetition mortgage lien.
2s9

260

Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 127-37.
862 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1989).
262
Id. at 1162.
,., 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir. 1996) .
2
6-1
Id. at 47-48.
265
Id. at 49 (citing In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 574); see also In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d 123,
127 (9th Cir. 1989).
266
In re McConville, 110 F.3d at 50.
,.,
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What the McConville court should have said was that the
creation of a lien is always a transfer of property. Because the
debtor-in-possession had no authority to convey the bankruptcy
estate (without court approval), the debtor-in-possession could do
nothing in derogation of the bankruptcy estate.
Nothing in
McConville was "avoided." The debtor-in-possession simply lacked
power to create a lien in the bankruptcy estate. This lack of
authority was partially remedied by the Mcconville court, which
elected to ratify the debtor-in-possession's action under § 364(c)
with regard to part of the mortgage lien. Ratification, not partial
avoidance, explains the result in McConville. 267
Finally, note should be taken of 40235 Washington Street Corp. v.
268
Lusardi.
Acknowledging that Ninth Circuit law had become a
hopeless mess, Lusardi emphatically renounced the Schwartz dictum
holding § 549(c) to be a defense to automatic stay voidness. 269 The
Shamblin confusion was left uncorrected and did not figure in the
case. These remarks will help us understand some otherwise

267

If McConville takes the position that § 549(a) does not pertain to the unauthorized
creation of a lien by a debtor-in-possession, In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989),
takes the opposite view. The Garcia court held that automatic stay voidness was entirely
unrelated to § 549(a) avoidance, and for this reason the § 549(d) statute of limitations was
irrelevant. Id. at 339. In so ruling, the court concluded that the real purpose of§ 549(a) was
to attack unauthorized conveyances by a bankruptcy trustee. Id.; accord, Sapir v. C.P.Q.
Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs.), 881 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that
where debtor-in-possession made unauthorized contract for future credit, trustee must avoid
it under§ 549(a)); In re Servico, Inc., 144 B.R. 933,936 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992). Because this
possibility preserved a utility for§ 549(d), the Garcia court felt it was free to rule that§ 549(d)
was irrelevant to automatic stay voidness. 109 B.R. at 340.
In my opinion, both views are wrong. If a trustee makes an unauthorized conveyance,
then it has no effect. The bankruptcy estate recovers the item transferred not because of
avoidance, but because the bankruptcy estate still owns it. There is no need to refer to the
automatic stay or avoidance when a bankruptcy trustee makes an unauthorized conveyance
from the bankruptcy estate. If§ 364 has a function, it is to grant the bankruptcy court the
power to ratify unauthorized acts of a bankruptcy trustee to the extent justice requires. See
supra text accompanying note 91.
Compare the highly similar In re Cybridge Corp., 304 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D.NJ. 2004), ajfd,
312 B.R. 262 (D.NJ. 2004) , discussed supra text accompanying notes 68-82. This case also
represented the unstrained quality of mercy, but not in terms of ratification. Rather, the
Cybridge court ruled that every new advance was a reimbursement for receivables earlier
collected. 304 B.R. at 691. It is possible to view Cybridge as undercutting the law of the
unauthorized postpetition loan.
'" 329 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2003).
269
Id. at I 082.
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incomprehensible moments in another important Ninth Circuit
270
case-Beeler v. Jewell (In re Stanton).
B.

The Stanton Case and § 549 Avoidance

In Stanton, D granted a real estate mortgage to A for future
discretionary advances that A might make to D's wholly owned
271
subsidiary ("S') . Subsequently, D filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy,
272
which was soon converted to chapter 7. All the while, A continued
to make discretionary advances to S, which was not bankrupt. The
trustee brought an adversary proceeding, seeking a declaration that
A's advances to S did not encumber the real estate now in the
273
b an kruptcy estate.
Proper analysis of the trustee's claim requires a review of
Washington's ambiguous law of the discretionary future advance.
Prior to 1973, discretionary advances created only junior security
274
interests.
Thus, if D conveyed a senior mortgage to A and a junior
mortgage to B, A's subsequent discretionary advance was in third
place behind B's mortgage. This was the holding in National Bank of
275
Washington v. Equity Investors, Inc.
In 1973, the Washington legislature reformed its mechanics'
lien law. Under the reform, mechanics' lienors gained a "stop
notice" right: If mechanics notify construction lenders that they are
unpaid, construction lenders are obliged to send committed funds
276
directly to the unpaid mechanics' lienor.
In connection with this,
the legislature enacted the following mysterious provision:
12771

12781

Except as otherwise provided in RCW 60.04.061
or 60.04.221,
any mortgage or deed of trust shall be prior to all liens, mortgages,

210
303 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), affg 248 B.R. 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). An earlier
withdrawn opinion exists at 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002).
"' 303 F.3d at 940.
212
Id.
21,
Id.

"' Nat'I Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, Inc., 506 P.2d 20, 26-26 (Wash. 1973).
"' Id. at 44-45. If, however, the lender has committed to advance funds, the committed
advances are senior.John M. Keltch, Inc. v. Don Hoyt, Inc., 483 P.2d 135 (Wash. App. 1971) .
In this respect, Washington mortgage law precisely replicates the U.C.C. rules pertaining to
discretionary and committed lenders. Carlson & Shupack, supra note 167, at 346-59.
276
Currently, this rule is codified at title 60, section 04.221 of the Washington Revised
Code ("RCW").
"' This provision states that a mechanics' lien is senior ifrecorded before a mortgage.
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deeds of trust, and other encumbrances which have not been
recorded prior to the recording of the mortgage or deed of trust to
the extent of all sums secured by the mortgage or deed of trust
regardless of when the same are disbursed or whether the
. b ursement.s are o bl"1gatory. 279
d 1s

Notice that this statute seems to empower A to make senior
discretionary advances against any intervening encumbrance, even
though the section is buried in the mechanics' lien provisions. An
early commentator assumed that the universal meaning of the
statute was fully intended-that A is now empowered to make senior
280
discretionary advances.
Another commentator has hinted
tentatively that RCW 60.04.226 subordinates only mechanics' lienors
28 1
to the discretionary advances of construction lenders.
This last
view is not implausible in that mechanics' lienors are given "stop
notice" rights against construction lenders, which divert future
advances to the mechanics' lienors directly. This valuable right
could have been a trade-off for a guarantee that construction
advances would otherwise be senior to intervening mechanics' liens.
Beyond this, nothing is known about the state of Washington law.
The federal courts therefore found themselves in the position of
282
making an "Erie guess" as to the content of Washington law, and
then applying acephalous bankruptcy law to it.
1.

In the Bankruptcy Court

In his opinion favoring avoidance, Bankruptcy Judge John
Rossmeissl assumed (sub silentio) that RCW 60.04.226 rendered A's
postpetition advances senior as a matter of Washington law.
According to Judge Rossmeissl, " [ t] he effect of each advance was to
increase the amount of debt secured by [D's] residence and thus
decrease the bankruptcy estate's equity in the residence. Each
283
advance was a transfer of the estate's equity to [A]. " Obviously, A's
218

This is the "stop notice " provisio n.
RCW 60.04.226 (2000) .
280
Richard Paroutaud, Mechanics' Liens: The "Stop Notice" Comes to Washington, 49 WASH. L.
REV. 685 (1974) .
28 1
WILLIAM B. ST O EBUCK, 18 WASH. PRACT. REAL E ST ATE: TRANSACTIONS § 17.25 (2002
Pocket Part) .
"' McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2002) .
"' Beeler v. Stanton (In re Stanton), 239 B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. E.D. Wash . 1999) (citing
rn
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advances decrease the bankruptcy estate's equity only if RCW
60.04.226 supplies the rule.
Consistent with RCW 60.04.226, A had argued that its
postpetition lien was actually a prepetition lien because any advance
284
"related back" to the creation of the lien.
This was the Gilmore
"unitary" view, which holds that liens are qualitative only-not
•
•
28s A
. not a new 11en.
. 286
quantitative.
ccord"mgIy, a new a dvance 1s
Judge Rossmeissl rejected A's argument, but he did not
altogether reject the unitary view. According to Judge Rossmeissl,
A's prepetition lien had fallen to zero and was revived by a future
287
advance.
Because a lien that is quantitatively zero is no lien at
288
all, the future advance created a new postpetition lien that the
289
trustee could avoid entirely.
This view is less than the "multiple"

Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In re Dreiling) , 233 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)). In
Dreiling, D owned 75% of the outstanding shares in a closely held corporation. 233 B.R. at
857. The other 25% was owned by a family trust. Id. After D's chapter 7 bankruptcy
commenced, the corporation watered the stock (now owned by the bankruptcy estate) so that
the bankruptcy estate owned only 43.5%. Id. at 862. The Dreiling court ruled that the dilution
of the stock was a postpetition transfer that was void under§ 549(a) . Id. at 863.
It is very hard to justify the conclusion that property of the estate had been
"transferred. " Rather, the issuer of the trustee 's shares took an action which rendered the
trustee from a majority to a minority shareholder. Arguably, it is not even clear that this
action harmed the value of the trustee's shares because the new shares may have been sold for
fair value. Although the power of a corporation to reduce the value of the trustee's shares is
problematic, it is not clear that§ 549(a) is the tool by which to accomplish justice.
'" In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 226-27.
"' GILMORE, supra note 181, § 35.6, at 935.
286
Judge Rossmeissl describes this argument as follows: "[A] argues that .. . its lien passes
through the bankruptcy and is unaffected by the discharge of the debtors personal liability."
In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 228-29. On appeal, this will be referred to A's § 506(d) argument.
According to § 506(d) (2), A's lien is void if it secures something other than an allowed
secured claim (i.e., a claim for which there is no proof of claim) unless "such claim is not an
allowed secured claim due only to the failure of an entity to file .a proof of such claim under
section 501 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (2000) .
28 7
In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 228.
288
In other words, liens are merely quantitative and not qualitative. This is a common
bankruptcy misconception, as where courts rule that § 1322(b)(2)'s protection of home
mortgages does not apply if the mortgage is entirely under water, as a lien with no value is the
same as no lien at all. For more on this misconception, see 2 GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note
57, § 27.09.
289
In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 228-29. By holding that a lien that falls to a quantitative zero
is no lien at all, Judge Rossmeissl puts himself in contradiction with Dick Warner Cargo
Handling Curp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1984). In Dick Warner, a
judicial lien creditor levied upon surplus cash controlled by the secured party. Id. at 128. The
secured party refused to hand it over. Id. Instead, the secured party incurred attorneys' fees
defending the fund. Id. Ironically, in defending the fund, the secured party destroyed the
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view; it implies that if A had kept one dollar of prepetition debt
outstanding, the entire postpetition advance would relate back to
the prepetition amount. Such an implication would make the
Washington law of future advances capricious indeed. Why should
there be one rule if one dollar of debt is outstanding and another if
no debt is outstanding? It would have been better if Judge
Rossmeissl had adopted the multiple theory in its entirety. As it
stood, however, Judge Rossmeissl found A's advances genuinely
postpetition events, creating senior liens on property of the
290
bankruptcy estate.
In addition to finding A was empowered to make senior
advances, Judge Rossmeissl ruled that the security agreement with D
was a "financial accommodation" contract that was automatically
29 1
rejected under Bankruptcy Code§ 365(c) (2).
For those who are
pristine about their logic, this holding-undoubtedly correctcontradicts the assumption that postpetition advances are capable of
encumbering property of the bankruptcy estate.
Automatic
rejection of a financial accommodation contract has the effect of
292
disaggregating the security agreement and the advances.
As a
result, the advances were not "under the security agreement" and
therefore did not constitute perfecting events within the meaning of
§ 546(b). Nor did they violate the automatic stay for the same
reason. Indeed, the advances created no interest in property of the
bankruptcy estate at all if the executory contract is viewed as
automatically rejected in D's bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, according to Judge Rossmeissl the advances did
create perfected security interests in property of the bankruptcy
293
estate, which the trustee could avoid under§ 549(a).
But if this is
so, the future advances constituted § 546(b) perfection events.
Since these events are privileged against the automatic stay and also
fund. Ultimately, the secured party prevailed, even though the judicial lien predated the
attorneys' fe es. Id. at 135. Thus, Dick Warner followed the unitary view for nonadvance
obligations, even while the 1972 am endments dictated the multiple view for actual advances.
If Dick Warner had adopted Judge Rossmeissl's zero quantity thesis, the judicial lien creditor
would have prevailed over post-garnishme nt attorneys' fees. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra
note 186.
,JO
In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 235.
~JI
Id. at 229-31.
"" See supra text accompanying notes 190-91. It should be emphasized that "automatic
rejection " disaggregates the postpetition advan ce from the security agreement whether the
postpetition advance is "committed" or entirely discretionary.
~" In re Stanton, 239 B.R. at 231-33.
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immune from§ 549(a) avoidance, the admission of A's presumptive
seniority to the bankruptcy trustee properly destroys all possibility of
avoidance.
Judge Rossmeissl did at least rule that A did not violate the
294
automatic stay by making advances to S.
However, his reasons for
so ruling are unpersuasive:
"The debtors['] active willing
participation in the factoring agreement between [A] and [S] with
knowledge and expectation that the guaranty and deed of trust were
operative does not support a finding that there was a violation of the
295
automatic stay. "
This reasoning, standing alone, cannot suffice,
because a debtor always actively participates in a prepetition security
agreement. Yet postpetition enforcement of the agreement clearly
constitutes a violation of the automatic stay. 296
Nevertheless, automatic rejection of the security agreement
explains the result actually reached by Judge Rossmeissl. Since the
postpetition advances are not "under the security agreement, " they
are completely impotent against and irrelevant to the bankruptcy
estate. For this reason, they did not violate the automatic stay.
According to Judge Rossmeissl, the trustee had a valid § 549(a)
297
theory against A's postpetition liens.
But this assumption put
Judge Rossmeissl in trouble with regard to§ 348(d), which governs
the effect of converting a chapter 11 case to chapter 7.
Section 348(d) is an exception to the general rule in § 348(a) .
According to § 348 (a), the date of the original petition governs for
all purposes of the converted chapter 7 case-with one exception.
According to§ 348(d) :
A c;laim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for
relief but before conversion in a case that is converted unde r section
1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title , other than a claim specified in
section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes as if such
claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the
. .
298
peut10n .

294

Id. at 234.

295

Id.

296

11 U.S.C.§362(a)(4) .
In re Stanton, 239 B.R. a t 232.
Emphasis added.

~"
298
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This section implies that if postpetition advances encumber estate
property, then, in a converted chapter 7 case, these postpetition
advances are to be considered prepetition advances. As such, they
create valid prepetition liens. In short, § 348(d) creates a "relation
back" rule of the sort that (according to some) § 546(b) (1)
embodies. 299
Judge Rossmeissl refused to follow the plain meaning of this
statute. Instead, he ruled that§ 348(,:l) only means that postpetition
advances are dischargeable in the chapter 7 case. 300 In other words,
"for all purposes" in § 348(d) really means "for purposes of the
debtor's discharge under § 727(a) and no other." As Judge
Rossmeissl put it, "[i]f section 549 is going to have any meaning,
then transfers avoided under section 549(a) should not be subject
301
to revival under section 348 (d) . "
Ironically, if A is empowered by § 546(b) to make senior
advances, § 549(a) properly has no meaning because § 546(b) is a
defense to § 549 avoidance. Equally, § 549(a) properly has no
meaning if the security agreement is deemed automatically rejected
in D's bankruptcy. Of course, the first view favors A and the second
view favors the bankruptcy trustee. But ifJudge Rossmeissl had seen
either of these points, he could have given full effect to the plain
meaning of§ 348(d) as written. The second view-the one adopted
by Judge Rossmeissl-is the better one. According to this view, A's
advances to S are simply not covered by the security agreement,
once the security agreement is rejected as a financial
302
accommodation within the meaning of§ 365(c)(2).
In short, no matter what the Washington law of the future
advance is, the trustee had no avoidance theory under either the
automatic stay or § 549(a) . Then again, he did not need one.
Because the security agreement was automatically rejected under
§ 365(c) (2), A could not claim a senior postpetition lien against the
bankruptcy estate.

m

'°"
!tOl
2
j()

See supra text accompanying n o tes 176-82.
In re Stanton , 239 B.R. at 333-34.
Id. a t 234.
Id. at 231.
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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed in a
divided opinion. According to Judge John Ryan,
[u]nder Ninth Circuit authority, the postpetition creation of a lien on
property of the estate is not a transfer of property for purposes of
§ 549 .... If the creation of a lien is not a transfer of property, then
the further encumbrance of estate property based on a prepetition
303
lien cannot be a transfer either.
304

Here, the Shamblin confusion has made its masterpiece. It will be
recalled that, according to Shamblin, postpetition lien creation is
305
deemed not a transfer of property.
Such liens are constantly
"shamblin"' toward Bethlehem to be born (but never quite getting
there).
In Shamblin, however, the effect of these dubious
metaphysics was to deprive X of postpetition booty. Judge Ryan took
Shamblin to mean the opposite. If, per Shamblin, discretionary
advances create no new liens, postpetition advances must "relate
back" to creation of the original mortgage. In effect, bad Shamblin
metaphysics, combined with the Gilmore "unitary" theory of security
interests, empowered A to take senior liens against property of the
bankruptcy estate for postpetition advances.
The "unitary" view espoused by Judge Ryan does not cohere
with the notion that the security agreement is an automatically
rejected financial accommodation contract, and indeed, Judge Ryan
306
expressly so ruled.
In Judge Ryan's opinion, the security
agreement was in fact three agreements: (1) an agreement between
Sand A; (2) D's guaranty agreement with S; and (3) D's mortgage
307
agreement with S.
Only the last agreement was at stake, in Judge
'
.
30s
B
ut th'1s was no executory contract. I t was an
Ryan s view.
executed contract and therefore it was not rejected. This was just
another way of restating Judge Ryan's "unitary" assumption that A's
mortgage was entirely a prepetition lien, and no postpetition event

""

In re Stanton, 248 B.R. 823, 828 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

'°' In re Shamblin, 890 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1989) .
~

,..

'° 1
""

See supra text accompanying notes 245-50.
In re Stantun, 239 B.R. at 830.
Id.
See id.

174

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

309

of relevance had ever occurred. In short, in Judge Ryan's view, the
postpetition advance of A was a non-event.
Judge Ryan also disagreed as to the role of§ 364. According to
310
my previous analysis, § 364 plays no analytical role.
Where a
bankruptcy trustee grants unauthorized liens in exchange for loans,
no transfer of the bankruptcy estate occurs. Section 364 exists to
empower courts to authorize a trustee's postpetition secured
lending. Judge Rossmeissl, in effect, agreed that § 364 does not
work; his only reference to§ 364 was to say that if A wanted to make
senior advances to S at the expense of the bankruptcy estate, A
3 11
would have to obtain court approval under§ 364. This was simply
a paraphrase of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Transamerica
Commercial Finance Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine,
12
Inc.) ,3 where the Ninth Circuit barred assumption of a financial
3 13
accommodation contract under § 365.
Under Sun Runner, any
financial accommodation had to be newly created and court3 14
approved under§ 364.
Judge Ryan took Judge Rossmeissl as using § 364 as an
avoidance tool: "The bankruptcy court voided [A] 's lien on
postpetition advances to [SJ because [D] failed to get court approval
3 15
under § 364(c)."
In fact, this was not so. The crux of Judge
Rossmeissl's opinion was contract rejection under § 365(c), which
disaggregated the advances from the security agreement. His
reference to § 364 was simply to explain how postpetition advances
3 16
might (but did not) come to encumber the ~ankruptcy estate.

m

Id.

:,,o

See supra text accompanying note 91 .
In re Shamblin, 239 B.R. at 233.
945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991) .

"'
"'
'"
'"
6

Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1092-93.
In re Stanton, 248 B.R. 823, 829 (B.A.P. 9th 2000).

In comparison, Judge Perris, in dissent, apparently approved of using § 364 as an
avoidance tool. Id. at 831-32; accord, In re Stanton, 303 F.3d 939, 941H7 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Gould,]., dissenting) . According to Judge Perris, "[i]t is irrelevant for our purposes that a
contingent prepetition claim existed with respect to the postpetition loan. " In re Stanton, 248
B.R. at 832. In fact, it is not irrelevant. But for executory contract rejection, the advances
might have been § 546(b) events, if indeed a contingent prepetition claim existed along the
lines of Judge Ryan's theory. The real reason the contingent prepetition claim is irrelevant is
because A's security agreement is a financial accommodation contract automatically rejected
under§ 365(c) (2).
:s i
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Judge Ryan took issue with the conclusion that only § 364
approval could empower A's advances to encumber the bankruptcy
estate. In Judge Ryan's view, A had complete freedom to make
postpetition advances to the prejudice of the bankruptcy estate,
even without court approval under § 364. In support of his view,
Judge Ryan emphasized that S (not a bankruptcy trustee) sought
317
credit.
Advances to S were therefore "outside the scope of
318
§ 364(c)."
He even suggested that to require authority under
319
§ 364 would be to pierce the corporate veil between Sand D.
Finally, Judge Ryan remanded this case back to the bankruptcy
court to consider A's claim under § 506(d). According to this
provision:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not
an allowed secured claim, such a lien is void unless(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the
failure of an entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501
of this title.

This provision states that A's lien is not void just because A filed no
proof of claim in D's bankruptcy. What claim did A have to make
under § 506(d)? In effect, A's claim under§ 506(d) was the very
unitary theory of liens that Judge Ryan fully adopted. Judge Ryan's
theory of the case was that the qualitative nature of A's mortgage
320
lien was "locked in" prior to the bankruptcy petition. Accordingly,
this lien passed through bankruptcy unaffected, permanently
empowering A to make senior advances in derogation of the
bankruptcy estate.
21
In Judge Ryan's view,3 Judge Rossmeissl never considered this
§ 506(d) point, but Judge Ryan was wrong. Judge Rossmeissl had

"'
3 1s
3 19

In re Stantun, 248 B.R. at 829.
Id.

Id. at 829 n.10. This is correctly dismissed by Judge Perris in dis.sent as overkill.
Indeed, a bankruptcy court may find cause to permit financing of a nonbankrupt subsidiary
or parent on the credit of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d at
1094 (implying as much). Such authority, appropriate if the bankruptcy estate is benefited,
would not constitute piercing the corporate veil. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit would repeat
the "piercing the veil" canard. In w Stantun, 303 F.3d at 942.
'"' In re Stantun, 248 B.R. at 831.
'" Id. at 830-31.
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322

expressly ruled on this point against A, just as Judge Ryan
323
expressly ruled in favor of A.
The remand order was therefore
quite unnecessary, as Judge Ryan himself had already decided the
324
"pass through" question in A's favor.

3.

The Ninth Circuit Opinion

On further appeal, in two split decisions, the Ninth Circuit
ostensibly affirmed. 325 But in reality, the Ninth Circuit remanded to
determine the true nature of Washington law. As a result, nothing
was accomplished, and the courts may have to rehearse the
controversy a second time. Yet the Ninth Circuit said enough to
suggest that Dis free to make postpetition transfers of D's right to
the bankruptcy surplus, even if these transfers cannot adversely
affect the bankruptcy trustee's senior judicial lien.
326
In the first opinion (later withdrawn) ,
Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld made the assumption that A was disempowered by
Washington law from making senior advances. Yet, significantly, A
327
could obtain a junior lien on property of the bankruptcy estate.
In short,Judge Kleinfeld assumed that the trustee was a lien creditor
on D's prepetition property. Junior advances not affecting the
328
trustee's lien were entirely permissible under Washington law.
Thus, this junior lien successfully encumbered D's right to the
bankruptcy surplus.
329
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit elected to revise its opinion
because it found itself ultimately uncertain as to the nature of
Washington law-i.e., whether Washington National Bank
(disempowering A) was overruled by RCW section 60.04.226
(empowering A):
[I] t may be that National Bank of Washington is either limited in the
mechanics' lien context or entirely abrogated. But the parties
neither briefed this issue nor addressed it in their argument to us.
"'
323
s24

325

'"
327

"'
,~

In re Stant<m, 248 B.R. 222, 227 (E.D. Wash. 1999) .
Id. at 831.
Id.
In re Stanton, 303 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), affg285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002 ).
In re Stanton, 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) .
Id. at 893.
See In re Stant<m, 303 F.3d at 943.
Id. a t 939.
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We thus need not reach the question whether any advances made
post-petition are subordinate to intervening claims, and we leave that
330
to the bankruptcy court to determine if necessary on remand.

In fact, Judge Kleinfeld had all the materials available on
Washington law before him-National Bank of Washington and RCW
section 60.04.226, plus a split between two commentators. Nothing
more is known of Washington law. He might have hazarded an Erie
Ul
guess on t h e matter as accurate1y as anyone.
In any event, the content of Washington law turns out to be
irrelevant. Even if A is empowered to make senior advances under
RCW section 60.04.226, the automatic rejection of A's security
agreement disaggregates A's advances from A's mortgage. The
trustee needs no avoidance theory to subordinate A's lien for
postpetition advances. Or, if A is disempowered, the trustee likewise
needs no avoidance theory to assert better rights over estate
property than A can claim, even if the security agreement survives
automatic rejection.
Judge Kleinfeld makes no mention of autvmatic rejection
under § 365(c) (2). In the absence of this ruling, state law is
determinative. This oversight made it possible for Judge Kleinfeld
to suggest that junior advances from A to S might create junior liens
on property of the estate. According to Judge Kleinfeld,
[t]his does not mean that when [A] loaned money to [SJ after [Dwas]
bankrupt, a new lien was created on [D's] house. If National Bank of
13321
Washington
is still good law, it would mean that when these
optional advances to [SJ were made, [A's] lien on the house, to the
extent of these subsequent advances, was junior to the priority of
intervening claims. National Bank of Washington thus would affect the
priority of an optional lien but would not change the existence of the
333
lien itself.

"" Id. at 943-44 (footnote omitted).
" ' In his dissent.Judge Ronald Gould was willing to declare that postpetition advances to
S were junior to any intervening encumbrance, pursuant to National Bank of Washingt,on. Id. at
948 n .9.
"' Nat'I Bank of Wash. v. Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973). This case holds
that A's discretionary advances are junior to intervening encumbrances.
"" In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 943. In the withdrawn opinion, this paragraph read as
follows:
This does not mean that when [A] loaned money to [S] after [D was] bankrupt, a
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The vocabulary in this passage is confusing, but the intuition is
sound. A is simply junior to the bankruptcy estate for postpetition
advances if National Bank of Washington is the law. This implies that
the trustee has a senior lien on D's house and D has the equity. A's
postpetition advance created a lien only on D's surplus interest in
the bankruptcy estate.
In Judge Kleinfeld's view, however, discretionary advances do
334
not create new liens.
This is the "unitary" theory of liens adopted
by Judge Ryan. Under it, the originally created prepetition lien
simply grows in size when a postpetition lien is given. Accordingly,
A had one single lien. But, according to Judge Kleinfeld, part of the
lien was senior and part of it was junior to the lien of the bankruptcy
335
trustee.
Unless quantum mechanics apply, 336 how can the same lien have
two different priorities? In a Newtonian universe, it must be the
case that A has two liens-one senior to the trustee's hypothetical
337
judicial lien and one junior to it.

new lien was created on [D's ] house. It means that when these optional advances to
[SJ were made, [A's] lien on the house, to the extent of these subsequent advances,

was junior to the priority of intervening claims. Thus, the bankruptcy trustee was
senior to [A's] lien for advances [A] made after [DJ filed for bankruptcy.
Washington law thus affects the frri.ority of an optional lien but does not change the
existence of the lien itself.
In re Stantari, 285 F.3d at 893.
"' See In re Stantari, 303 F.3d at 942.
'" Id. at 943.
"° In quantum mechanics, all particles are everywhere all the time. Carlson, supra note
20, at 440-41. In the macro-Newtonian world, however, every lien has a unique position.
ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 139 (2000) ("[B]eing is a result of
measurement; that is, 'to be' means 'to already have a measure'-for being is merely an
abstraction from concrete measurement, or a reduction and fixing of immeasurable
singularity.").
"' In his dissent,Judge Gould complained:
The majority attempts to distinguish between the priority given to a lien under
Washington law and the attachment of the lien under state law, apparently because
Washington cases use the term "priority" in discussions of liens based on optional
advances and because making such a distinction provides necessary support for the
majority's holding. However, nowhere does the case law distinguish between the
priority to be given to a lien and the date that it attaches, and there is simply no
basis to conclude that such a distinction exists, particularly in light of the axiom
that the priority of a lien is determined by the date of its attachment or perfection
by recordation.
In re Stantari, 285 F.3d at 897 n .7 (citation omitted) . Judge Kleinfeld was obviously confused
by John M. Keltch, Inc. v. Dari Huyt, Inc., 583 P.2d 135 (Wash. App. 1971), which held that
obligatory advances are senior to intervening lien creditors. This case hints that discretionary
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But did A violate the automatic stay in making advances to S?
338
Appropriately, Judge Kleinfeld held no.
This is perfectly correct
under any view of the matter. Either A is disempowered from
making senior advances (under National Bank of Washington) or A is
empowered under RCW 60.04.226. If disempowered, A's advances
simply have no effect on the bankruptcy estate and do not violate
the stay for that reason. If empowered, A falls within the purview of
339
§ 546(b) and§ 362(b) (3) and is invited to use that power at will.
Judge Kleinfeld's reasoning, however, was different.
He
invoked the metaphysical aid of Shamblin to describe why the
automatic stay had no bite:
Violation of the automatic stay is a serious business, exposing the
violator in some circumstances to punitive damages and sanctions for
contempt. Banks and other lenders may well tremble at the notion
that they and possibly their officers could face such severe sanctions if
they lend money to a corporation one of whose shareholders has
gone bankrupt.
Many close corporations, such as small
manufacturers and professional practices, secure debt with
shareholders' property as well as corporate property. Shareholders
sometimes go bankrupt while the corporation continues as a
financially healthy business.
Section 362 (a) ( 4) does not apply. That subsection stays any "act
to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate."
A loan of money to a debtor not in bankruptcy does none of those
things, as the Bankruptcy Appeals Panel majority stressed . . . . The
lien against [D's] house was created when they gave the factor a ...
mortgage, prior to the bankruptcy filing. That was a conveyance of

advances are indeed junior. See id. at 138. Judge Gould clearly saw, however, that the rules for
committed and discretionary advances are entirely separate and appropriately opposite to
each other. In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 948 n .8.
,,. See In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 942.
"" Judge Kleinfeld agreed entirely with Judge Ryan 's view of the role of§ 364. Id. at 946.
It will be recalled that Judge Ryan ruled that D did not need permission to make advances to
S. In re Stanton, 248 B.R. at 829. This assumes, of course, that no automatic rejection of a
financial accommodation contract has occurred, so that A is empowered by § 546(b) (l) to
make senior advances. So empowered, A needs no permission from the court under § 364 to
proceed. On the other hand , if A's advances create junior liens, they do not adversely affect
the bankruptcy estate and do not put funds into the bankruptcy trustee's hands. Either way,
§ 364 drops from the equation.
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an interest in real property, namely, a lien. The subsequent advances
340
merely affected how much money the lien secured.

Once again, Shamblin metaphysics are on display. Under this view,
no postpetition lien can ever be created on the estate, whether A is
empowered to give senior advances or not. A better view of the
matter would have been that, if A's advances are senior, 341 they are
perfection events within the meaning of § 362(b) (3) and
§ 546(b) (1). The stay is not violated when such perfecting events
occur. Or, if A's advances create junior liens, these liens do not
harm the bankruptcy estate. They merely attach to D's surplus
under§ 726(a) (6). As Dis free to convey this surplus, the automatic
stay is not offended.
Finally,Judge Kleinfeld upheldJudge Ryan's remand of A's so342
called § 506(d) theory.
Recall that this theory was simply a proxy
for A's "unitary" account of Washington law. 343 Since Judge Ryan
adopted the unitary theory wholesale, there was no sense in
remanding the § 506(d) question.
But Judge Kleinfeld was
genuinely agnostic about the state of Washington law. Judge
Kleinfeld's remand makes more sense. 344
Id. at 941-42 (footnotes omitted).
Seniority, of course, would mean that the security agreement was not a financial
accommodation contract within the meaning of§ 365(c) (2). See supra text accompanying
notes 188-92.
"'' See In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 944.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 303-09.
'" In his dissent, Judge Gould insisted that Washington law was clear. In re Stanton, 303
F.3d at 949. A could not make senior advances under the ruling of National Bank of Washington
v. Equity Investors, Inc., and RCW 60.04.226 was not intended to overrule National Bank, but was
limited to the priorities between mechanics' lienors and construction financers . Id. at 948,
948 n.9. Yet if that is the case, the automatic stay is not offended by these advances because
they cannot adversely affect the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 947-48. Nor was it necessary to find,
as Judge Gould did, a shadowy negative avoidance power in § 364 because the trustee's
interest in the real estate is simply senior to that of A. Id. at 946-47. In short, it would have
sufficed to assert the seniority of the bankruptcy trustee without any reference to the
automatic stay or§ 549(a).
Judge Gould also worried about the meaning of§ 348(d), which states:
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but
before conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of
this title, other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated
for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing
of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 348(d). The bankruptcy court refused to follow the plain meaning of this
provision . A's argument was that§ 348(d) turned A's postpetition advance into a prepetition
advance, which would then be senior to the trustee's right. In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 942.
""'

1

"'
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To summarize, then, the Ninth Circuit should have ruled that
A's security agreement with D was rejected; no advance by A to S
could possibly fall under it to encumber property of the bankruptcy
estate.
But having overlooked this point, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the bankruptcy estate has a quantitative limit. D
always has a bankruptcy surplus right, which might be encumbered
by A's discretionary advances. Under state law, these advances
might be junior. Yet they still attach to D's surplus interest in the
bankruptcy estate. This postpetition attachment occurs only if the
strong arm theory of the bankruptcy estate is true. If the fee simple
theory exists, there can be no question of A's junior status to the
bankruptcy estate.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I hoped to set out a coherent VIS1on of
postpetition transfers under§ 549(a). What I found was complete
doctrinal acephality.
Postpetition transfers are subject to the
overlapping theories of § 549(a) "avoidance" and automatic stay
"voidness." I have struggled to reconcile these two doctrines, but my
success has been modest at best. Only so many steps toward a
coherent theory of this area of law are possible on the current text
of the Bankruptcy Code.
After considerable cleanup, I found that the Ninth Circuit's
5
recent opinion in Beeler v. Jewell (In re Stanton/4 reveals something
very interesting about the bankruptcy estate. The trustee does not

Judge Gould seems to have misunderstood this argument; he took A to be arguing that "any
violation of the automatic stay instituted in the Chapter 11 case becomes irrelevant once the
case is converted to Chapter 7." In re Stanton, 303 F.3d at 949. Judge Gould relied on two
cases to show that A's advance was void as a violation of the automatic stay. Yet the two cases
cited undermine , not aid.Judge Gould's position.
In British Aviation Insurance Co. v. Menu/ (In re State Airlines, Inc.), 873 F.2d 264 (11th Cir.
1989), Cwas injured in an airplane crash. D then filed for chapter 11 protection. Id. at 265.
C obtained relief from the automatic stay. Id. at 265-66. D's case was converted to chapter 7.
Id. at 266. D's insurer claimed that the conversion order reinstituted the automatic stay. Id.
The court disagreed: the lifting of the stay survived conversion of the case and C was free to
proceed outside bankruptcy court. Id. at 269.
In Johnson v. Garden State Brickface & Stucco Co., 150 B.R. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the court
concluded that§ 362(a) never applies to D's postpetition tort victims. This is, by the way, an
extremely questionable holding. In any case, it hardly supports Judge Gould's position.
Quite the opposite is true. Johnson suggests that the automatic stay never affects postpetition
claims at all.
'" 303 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), affg248 B.R. 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
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own the debtor's prepetition property straight out. The trustee only
has a lien on it. For this reason, a debtor always has a valid
postpetition transfer to make. The debtor owns a surplus right to
the bankruptcy estate under§ 726(a) (6). Section 549(a) avoidance
can never apply to undo this conveyance simply because the surplus
is beyond the estate, and no conveyance of it can adversely affect the
bankruptcy trustee.

